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OPINION DAVIES, Judge. Appellants challenge the constitutionality, under Minn.Const. art. 1, § 16, and art. 13, § 2, the establishment of religion clauses, of the Post-Secondary Enrollment Options Act (PSEOA). Appellants challenge a grant of summary judgment. We affirm as to all respondents except Bethel College. FACTS In 1985, appellants began an action in federal court alleging that Minn.Stat. § 123.3514 (1990), the PSEOA, violated both the federal and state constitutions. At the state’s request, the challenges based on state law were dismissed without prejudice. Appellants’ federal claims later were dismissed on summary judgment. Minnesota Fed’n of Teachers v. Nelson, 740 F.Supp. 694, 721 (D.Minn.1990) (hereafter MFT v. Nelson). Appellants then sued respondents in state court, alleging that the PSEOA violates the Minnesota Constitution. One count of appellants’ complaint was dismissed voluntarily. The trial court granted summary judgment as to the other counts. Appellants challenge that grant of summary judgment. The purpose of Minn.Stat. § 123.3514 (1990) is to promote rigorous academic pursuits and to provide a variety of options to high school pupils by encouraging and enabling secondary pupils to enroll full time or part time in nonsectarian courses or programs in eligible post-secondary institutions. Id. subd. 2. An eligible institution is a Minnesota public post-secondary institution, * * * or a private, residential, two-year or four-year, liberal arts, degree-granting college or university located in Minnesota. Id. subd. 3. Eleventh and twelfth grade students in the public schools may apply to any eligible college or university. If the student is accepted, the student may take courses for either secondary or post-secondary credit. If the student elects to take the courses for secondary credit, the student need not pay tuition, fees, or the cost of books. Instead, the state pays the college or university those costs or a lesser amount. According to the evidence before the federal court, “reimbursement received from the state is less than the actual instructional charges for courses attended by PSEOA students” at all the colleges, and “on average, * * * [was] only 53.05 percent of the actual costs * * * for PSEOA students during the 1988-89 school year.” MFT v. Nelson, 740 F.Supp. at 704. The evidence presented in the federal action also indicated that, with the exception of Bethel College: 1) neither course structure nor course content is controlled by the church or denomination with which the respondent colleges are affiliated; 2) the respondent colleges admit both PSEOA and non-PSEOA students without regard to creed and they select students “only if they demonstrate academic excellence and personal maturity through their high school record, activities and personal references”; 3) the respondent colleges do not require attendance at religious services, do not enforce adherence to religious dogma, and do not attempt to indoctrinate or proselytize students; 4) the respondent colleges all follow the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom of the American Association of University Professors such that “all courses are taught according to the academic requirements which are intrinsic to the subject matter, and the individual teacher’s concept of professional standards”; and 5) PSEOA students may not take religion or theology courses. Id. at 697. ISSUES 1. Did the trial court err in holding that the PSEOA does not violate article 1, section 16, and article 13, section 2, of the Minnesota Constitution, the establishment of religion clauses? 2. Did the trial court err in holding that the parties are collaterally estopped by the federal court’s determinations that the institutions are nonsectarian and that the institutions did not benefit or use the funds for religious purposes? ANALYSIS The trial court granted summary judgment for respondent colleges. In a review of summary judgment this court is to determine whether genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the law has been applied correctly. Betlach v. Wayzata Condominium, 281 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn.1979). Conclusions of law are not binding on appellate courts. A.J. Chromy Constr. Co. v. Commercial Mechanical Serv., Inc., 260 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Minn. 1977). The relevant clauses of the Minnesota Constitution on establishment of religion read as follows: [N]or shall any money be drawn from the treasury for the benefit of any religious societies or religious or theological seminaries. Minn.Const. art. 1, § 16. In no case shall any public money or property be appropriated or used for the support of schools wherein the distinctive doctrines, creeds or tenets of any particular * * * religious sect are promulgated or taught. Minn.Const. art. 13, § 2. Appellants argue that the respondent colleges are religious societies which teach religion and that they are benefitted or supported by public monies through the PSEOA in violation of these clauses of the constitution. A statute is presumed constitutional, Hickman v. Group Health Plan, 396 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Minn.1986), and the challenger has the heavy burden of demonstrating unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Minn.1990), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931, 110 S.Ct. 2633, 110 L.Ed.2d 653 (1990). Twice during the 1970s, the Minnesota Supreme Court dealt with the interpretation of the two constitutional provisions at issue and those two cases provide the basis for our analysis here. 1. Americans United In Americans United, Inc. v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 622, 288 Minn. 196, 179 N.W.2d 146 (1970), the court dealt with the use of public funds to transport children to sectarian primary and secondary schools. Id. at 197-98, 179 N.W.2d at 147. The court upheld the statute despite the court’s conclusion that support for parochial primary and secondary schools was “equivalent to support of religion.” Id. at 215, 179 N.W.2d at 156. Because it concluded the schools were religious in nature, the court had to determine what constituted support or benefit to an institution and whether our constitution precluded every potential benefit. The supreme court reviewed cases from other states, analyzing both the majority and minority views among states with similar constitutional provisions. See id. at 202-05, 179 N.W.2d at 150-51. The court then applied the first two steps of the analysis later adopted in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), looking first at whether there was a secular purpose for the legislation and then at the primary effect of the legislation in advancing or inhibiting religion. Americans United, 288 Minn. at 209, 214, 179 N.W.2d at 153, 156. The court adopted a view consistent with the majority of states. See id. at 202-05, 214, 179 N.W.2d at 150-51, 156. In so doing, it rejected an interpretation of the Minnesota Constitution that would prohibit any indirect or incidental benefit to religiously oriented institutions, even if an institution is so pervasively sectarian that some aid to religion results. The court said: We do not believe that the purpose and primary effect of the statute is to benefit religion or to support sectarian schools. These results, in our opinion, are purely incidental and inconsequential. Id. at 214, 179 N.W.2d at 156. Thus, the court found that indirect or incidental aid to sectarian primary and secondary schools did not violate Minn. Const, art. 1, § 16, nor the provision of Minn. Const. art. 13, § 2, against using public money for “schools wherein the distinctive doctrines * * * of any particular * * * religious sect are promulgated or taught.” See id. at 214-15, 179 N.W.2d at 156. While the payments under the PSEOA are made directly to the colleges, the federal district court earlier found that “[i]t is the student’s choice of which [college or university] to attend that determines the flow of funds from the state to the religiously affiliated [college or university]” and that “[o]n its face the statute neutrally defines institutions eligible to participate in the program.” MFT v. Nelson, 740 F.Supp. at 704. As a result, the court held that the aid is indirect and, even if it were direct, that: [W]here a statute neutrally provides assistance to a class defined without reference to religion, and where any aid ultimately flowing to a religion results from the private choices of individual beneficiaries, the statute will not violate the second part of the Lemon test regardless of the sectarian nature of the institutions ultimately receiving the funds. Id. at 705. We agree that the statute here is neutral in defining the institutions that may participate in the program and that any potential benefit to the schools is indirect because it results from the individual choices by beneficiaries and is incidental because costs are only partially reimbursed. As a result, we hold that under Americans United, the funding of the PSEOA does not violate the establishment clauses of the Minnesota Constitution. 2. Hawk In Minnesota Higher Educ. Facilities Auth. v. Hawk, 305 Minn. 97, 232 N.W.2d 106 (1975), the Minnesota Supreme Court dealt with the use of tax-exempt revenue bonds to refinance construction debts for structures required or useful in connection with the operation of only accredited nonsectarian, nonprofit educational insti tutions providing a course of study above the high school level. Id. at 98, 232 N.W.2d at 107. Although the court explicitly declined to decide whether Minn. Const, art. 13, § 2, applied only to primary and secondary schools, id. at 108 n. 15, 232 N.W.2d at 112 n. 15, the court in Hawk characterized the religiously affiliated colleges there involved as “secular in nature” and concluded that: [Tjhere is absolutely no evidence to compel this court to conclude that the benefits from the Act will support the promulgation of religious beliefs. Id. at 108, 232 N.W.2d at 112. The court explained the criteria it used to determine that the colleges were secular or nonsectarian. It said: The Authority further found the colleges to be nonseetarian; that students are admitted without discrimination; that enrolled students are not * * * discriminated against because of * * * creed * * *; that chapel attendance is not required; that they do not promulgate any distinctive religious doctrines, creeds, or tenets of any particular religious sect; that all courses of study * * * are taught according to the requirements of the subject matter and the instructor’s concept of professional standards. * * * Additionally, there was uncontroverted evidence * * * that the relationship of the colleges to religious organizations had no effect upon the secular content of their curriculum. In fact, the colleges all adhere to the 19⅛0 Statement of Principles of Academic Freedom and Tenure endorsed by the American Association of University Professors and the Association of American Colleges. Id. at 101, 232 N.W.2d at 109. The criteria identified in Hawk are nearly identical to those used by the federal court in MFT v. Nelson, 740 F.Supp. at 697, and to those used by the district court in this case to determine that the respondent colleges are nonsectarian. In Hawk, the court found that direct aid (albeit not “public funds”) to religiously affiliated colleges did not violate the provisions of Minn. Const. art. 13, § 2, because, unlike the primary and secondary schools in Americans United, the colleges were secular in nature and not sectarian. In this case, unlike Hawk, state monies are paid directly to colleges and the unsettled issues are whether these payments go to sectarian institutions and whether they constitute “support.” The federal district court in MFT v. Nelson specifically dealt with the fact issues of “support” and the nature of respondent colleges. In an exhaustive analysis, the federal trial court applied the Lemon criteria, first to a facial challenge to the statutory language of the PSEOA, and then in an “as applied” challenge to its actual operation as to respondent colleges. The court found the statutory language met the Lemon criteria on its face. MFT v. Nelson, 740 F.Supp. at 703. The court then identified 36 factors for determining whether an institution was “pervasively sectarian” and applied these factors to each respondent college, finding that, with the exception of Bethel, none was pervasively sectarian. Id. at 714-20. Finally, the court looked at the respondent colleges’ use of funds in order to determine whether, despite the generally nonsectarian nature of the colleges, any funds had been used for religious activities. Id. at 720. The court found that: All of the evidence in the record * * * indicates that funds provided to [respondent colleges] are paid in accordance with the statutory formula solely for the purposes of reimbursing [respondent colleges] for tuition, costs and fees incurred by them in teaching non-sectarian courses. Id. We hold that the PSEOA is constitutional, under Hawk, where the colleges and universities are secular and there is no showing that funds are used to promulgate religious beliefs. 3. Collateral Estoppel The state district court held that collateral estoppel arose from the federal court’s determinations 1) as to the nonsec tarian nature of the colleges and 2) as to the use of funds by the respondent colleges, which pertains to whether there was “support” for religion. Appellants challenge this holding. The classic doctrine of collateral estoppel states that a “right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction * * * cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies.” Ryan v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 414 N.W.2d 470, 472 (Minn.App.1987) (quoting Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49, 18 S.Ct. 18, 27, 42 L.Ed. 355 (1897)), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 1988). Collateral estoppel bars relitigation of identical issues already litigated by the parties which are “necessary and essential to the resulting judgment.” Ellis v. Minneapolis Comm’n on Civil Rights, 319 N.W.2d 702, 704 (Minn.1982). The federal court analyzed whether these colleges were “pervasively sectarian,” deciding that they were not, and determined that the actual use of public funds by the respondent colleges did not aid religion. It seems clear that, as an essential step in making its analysis of federal law, the federal court determined factual issues identical to those necessary to a decision in this state case and that collateral estoppel is appropriate. 4. Bethel The trial court noted that collateral estoppel included Bethel College because the federal action against Bethel was dismissed with prejudice, which acts as an adjudication on the merits. Collateral es-toppel as to a fact requires, however, that the fact be directly determined by the court. See Ryan, 414 N.W.2d at 472. The federal district court concluded that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the secular/sectarian nature of Bethel and its use of PSEOA funds. MFT v. Nelson, 740 F.Supp. at 720. As a result, summary judgment was denied as to Bethel. Id. at 721. Thereafter, at the request of the parties, the action against Bethel was dismissed. The federal court, as a result, did not have occasion to determine the facts we rely on in ruling for the other respondents. We hold, therefore, that the dismissal with prejudice, while acting as a bar to relitigation of the federal claims against Bethel, does not establish by collateral estoppel the facts now relevant to the state claims. We hold that collateral estoppel does not operate to preclude litigation of these facts. Thus, as to Bethel, we reverse and remand. 5. Summary Judgment As the trial court order pointed out, appellants have neither challenged facts nor presented any additional facts. In challenging a motion for summary judgment, one must affirmatively present evidence of a factual dispute. Celotex Corp. v. Carett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Appellants have not done so. Summary judgment was appropriate. DECISION In sum, in Americans United, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that even where sectarian primary and secondary schools were involved, indirect and incidental benefits to the schools were not prohibited by the Minnesota Constitution. Here, the payments, made to nonsectarian colleges and universities, are likewise made under a neutral statute and any benefits are incidental and the indirect result of the individual choices of beneficiaries. In Hawk, the court held that aid to religiously affiliated colleges did not violate the establishment clauses of the Minnesota Constitution where the colleges were nonsectarian in nature and the funds were not used to aid religion. Here, it was determined that the schools were nonsectarian and that the PSEOA payments were not used to aid religion. Each of these supreme court interpretations of the Minnesota Constitution independently support the rulings of the trial court in this case, except as to Bethel College. As to Bethel College, in the absence of findings, we reverse and remand. Affirmed as to respondents other than Bethel College. Reversed and remanded as to respondent Bethel College.

OPINION THOMAS G. FORSBERG, Judge This appeal is from a judgment of conviction and sentence for second- and fifth-degree controlled substance crime and the gross misdemeanor offense of giving a false name to a police officer. We affirm in part and reverse in part, vacating the sentences for fifth-degree controlled substance crime and giving a false name to police. FACTS In July and August of 1998, police officers in Duluth were investigating a suspected drug selling operation. The investigation focused on two residences, including one at 1119 North Lake Avenue at which appellant Garland Barnes was a guest. The investigation centered on a number of people, including an individual known on the street as “Chill,” and later identified as Barnes. On August 9,1998, Duluth police officers stopped three people, including a man who identified himself as Mahlon Barnes but carried documents with the name Garland Barnes. Based on suspicion that one of the three had discarded a bag of crack cocaine found near a van that was licensed in the name of Garland Barnes, police searched the van pursuant to a warrant and found crack cocaine and marijuana in the vehicle. In the weeks following this incident, police obtained information from a number of confidential reliable informants (CRIs) reporting that Barnes and others were selling crack cocaine in Duluth. The reports identified two vehicles being used in the drug trafficking, and indicated that the drug sales were occurring at 119 East Fourth Street, but that the dealers were also using the residence at 1119 North Lake Avenue. One of the vehicles identified was listed to a Daphne Barnes, with a Minneapolis address identical to the address shown on Garland Barnes’s driver’s license. The search warrant affidavit alleged that CRI # 3 had seen the driver of this car and two companions in possession of crack cocaine. Another CRI told police that, less than three days before the search warrant was obtained, he or she saw “Chill” deliver crack cocaine to customers. The same CRI told police that “Chill” was a member of the “Native Mob” gang. Finally, that CRI participated in a controlled buy of cocaine from Barnes within 72 hours of the search warrant application. Police obtained a search warrant for the two vehicles, the person of Barnes, and the residence at 1119 North Lake Avenue. The search warrant was executed on August 26,1998. Police discovered quantities of crack cocaine and marijuana at the residence, much of it located in the bedroom where Barnes was found when police entered the house. Police also found a scale, cutting agents, and large amounts of cash. At the omnibus hearing, Barnes’s attorney challenged the search warrant, primarily on the grounds that Officer Jenkins, the officer who applied for the warrant, did not personally meet with most of the CRIs cited in the application. Officer Jenkins testified that he was assigned to the Gang Strike Force. He admitted that he had never met Barnes, and that several of the CRIs had talked to the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), not to him or to other officers of the Gang Strike Force. Officer Jenkins testified that Duluth police had made a similar application for a warrant to search 1119 Lake Avenue North on August 25, the day before they obtained and executed the search warrant challenged by Barnes. Police, however, chose not to execute the August 25 warrant after they obtained additional information from the fifth CRI. The trial court denied Barnes’s suppression motion. The court concluded that the search warrant was supported by probable cause and that there was no evidence of a material or intentional misrepresentation in the search warrant application. The court later granted Barnes’s request to dismiss his attorney and proceed pro se. After a mistrial was declared because of the state’s failure to disclose a police report, the jury in a second trial found Barnes guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Barnes to 111 months for the second-degree offense and a concurrent 24 months on the fifth-degree offense. The court imposed a concurrent one-year sentence on the gross misdemeanor offense of giving a false name to police. ISSUES 1. Was the search warrant supported by probable cause? 2. Was there reasonable suspicion justifying a no-knock entry to execute the search warrant? 3. Is the evidence sufficient to prove that appellant constructively possessed the cocaine and marijuana? 4. Did the trial court err in sentencing appellant on possession of marijuana and providing a false name to police? ANALYSIS I. Barnes argues that the warrant authorizing the search of 1119 North Lake Avenue was not supported by probable cause. He argues that the search warrant did not contain sufficient detail concerning the CRIs who provided information to police, particularly their “track records” for reliability and their basis of knowledge. A reviewing court extends “great deference” to an issuing magistrate’s determination that a search warrant is supported by probable cause. State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn.1998). Appellate review is limited to ensuring that the issuing magistrate had a “substantial ba sis” for concluding that probable cause existed. State v. Zanter, 535 N.W.2d 624, 633 (Minn.1995) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). The search warrant application established that a number of CRIs reported that Barnes, known as “Chill,” was selling cocaine, had been seen driving between 119 East Fourth Street, where most of the sales occurred, and 1119 North Lake Avenue, that Barnes listed 1119 North Lake as his address on a temporary registration for a motor vehicle, that a controlled buy of cocaine had been made from Barnes, and that a car believed involved in the drug trafficking had been seen parked outside 1119 North Lake. This information provided more than a “substantial basis” for concluding that there was probable cause to search the residence at 1119 North Lake Avenue and the person of Barnes. Barnes presents no support for his claim that police must have observed the suspect selling drugs. See State v. Richardson, 514 N.W.2d 573, 576, 580 (Minn.App.1994) (warrant supported by probable cause where police saw informant meet with suspected middleman, but not with appellant). Barnes’s assertion that the officer applying for the search warrant must have personally spoken with the informants cited in it is also without merit. Search warrant applications frequently rely on information gathered by different officers, even officers from different agencies. See State v. Kahn, 555 N.W.2d 15, 17 (Minn.App.1996) (search warrant application citing information acquired by other officer from different agency). So long as this sharing of information does not result in misrepresentations being stated in the application, it does not invalidate the warrant. Cf. State v. Causey, 257 N.W.2d 288, 294 (Minn.1977) (noting that police transmission of notes of conversations created risk of error). Barnes asserts that the officer who applied for the search warrant admitted some of the CRIs did not exist. This assertion, however, misconstrues Officer Jenkins’s omnibus hearing testimony. The officer could not personally vouch for the existence of the informants he had not himself spoken to, but he cast no doubt on their existence. Barnes argues that the warrant application was deficient because it failed to detail the accuracy rate of the informants. The application did state the number of arrests that information from two of the informants had led to. The supreme court has expressed a preference for providing “the past accuracy rate of the informant” in the warrant application. State v. Wiley, 366 N.W.2d 265, 269 n. 1 (Minn.1985). But in Wiley the search warrant application was based on information from a single CRI, supported by minimal corroboration obtained by police. See id. at 268. Here, the warrant application cited information from five informants, along with a controlled buy and police corroboration of key details. The failure to include the accuracy rates of the informants does not, under the “totality of the circumstances,” invalidate the warrant. Finally, Barnes argues that he presented sufficient evidence to prompt disclosure of the identity of the informants, or at least an in camera inquiry. But the record does not show any defense request for disclosure of the identity of the informants. II. Barnes argues that the provision in the warrant allowing police to make an unannounced entry was not supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion that the occupants of the house might be armed or might dispose of evidence. Where the material facts are not in dispute, this court independently reviews whether a no-knock entry was justified. See State v. Wasson, 615 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn.2000). As the state points out, Barnes did not challenge the no-knock provision in the warrant at the omnibus hearing. Barnes elicited no testimony about the no-knock entry at the omnibus hearing, and failed to brief the issue in his post-hearing memorandum. This court generally will not review an issue, even a constitutional claim, if it was not raised in the trial court. See State v. Sorenson, 441 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Minn.1989). But the interests of justice warrant addressing the issue. See id. In support of the no-knock provision, the search warrant application stated: Your affiant knows through training and experience that gang-members and drug dealers often carry, possess, own and store firearms to protect themselves from rival gangs, rival drug dealers and Police and further, that gang-members and their associates often use violence as a means of establishing territory, dominance and to evade Law Enforcement $ ⅜; ⅜ ⅜ The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce rule instituted in Wisconsin for all felony drug cases. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 1421, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997). The Court stated: Thus, the fact that felony drug investigations may frequently present circumstances warranting a no-knock entry cannot remove from the neutral scrutiny of a reviewing court the reasonableness of the police decision not to knock and announce in a particular case. Id. The state argues that, despite Richards, the “drug outlet” exception previously developed in Minnesota remains valid. See State v. Lien, 265 N.W.2d 833, 839 (Minn.1978) (holding no-knock entry authorized if application shows house is being used as a drug outlet). But our supreme court has followed Richards in rejecting a blanket exception for all felony drug cases. See Wasson, 615 N.W.2d at 320-21. The state presents no persuasive argument for permitting a blanket exception for “drug outlets” but not for residences otherwise involved in drug trafficking. The search warrant application, however, established more than the fact that 1119 North Lake Avenue was a residence involved in suspected drug dealing. The warrant also established that Barnes, a known gang member with a record of incarceration, had been observed with other individuals in what appeared to be an extensive drug dealing operation involving large amounts of cocaine. The showing required for a no-knock entry “is not high.” Richards, 520 U.S. at 394, 117 S.Ct. at 1422. Police need only reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, to believe that knocking and announcing would be dangerous or futile, in order to support a no-knock entry. Id. at 394, 117 S.Ct. at 1421. The Richards Court acknowledged that many, but not all, drug investigations “pose special risks to officer safety * * * .” Id. at 393, 117 S.Ct. at 1421. The drug investigation in this case, which had uncovered evidence of a group of men, including some with gang affiliations, involved in dealing large amounts of crack cocaine, appears to have been the type of drug investigation that would pose a special risk to officer safety. The no-knock provision in the warrant was not based solely on the fact that drugs were involved. Barnes argues that the no-knock provision was invalid because the application presented no specific, objective information about weapons or drug amounts present at 1119 North Lake. Barnes notes that in Wasson, weapons had been seized before from the home to be searched, 615 N.W.2d at 320-21, and that in United States v. Tavarez, 995 F.Supp. 443, 447 (S.D.N.Y.1998), an informant had seen small, easily accessible and therefore readily disposable quantities of drugs inside the residence. But Barnes’s proposed requirement of specific information about conditions inside the house would virtually impose a proba ble-cause standard on no-knock provisions. The standard, however, is only reasonable suspicion. Richards does not prevent police and judges from making reasonable inferences. It only insists on a case-by-case analysis. See Adina Schwartz, “Homes as Folding Umbrellas: Two Recent Supreme Court Decisions on ‘Knock and Announce’,” 25 Amer. J.Crim. Law 545, 589-90 (1998) (concluding that Richards reflects a disapproval of blanket exceptions, not an intent to discourage no-knock entries). We need not decide whether a no-knock entry could be based solely on evidence of drug dealing and gang affiliation. The warrant application also showed that Barnes had a prior criminal record and that the level of drug trafficking was very high. Thus, the no-knock request in the application did not rely on the simple, generalization, rejected in Richards, that all drug dealing involves weapons. Instead it added details specific to this case, although not about actual conditions inside the house, that supported the inference that knocking and announcing might impose a danger to police officers. Although the search warrant application should have explicitly connected Barnes’s prior record and the level of drug trafficking to the no-knock request, those two facts, combined with the drug dealing itself and the gang affiliation, meet the reasonable suspicion standard. Police should reassess the need for a no-knock entry at the scene, and may even execute a no-knock entry based on an assessment at the scene when a no-knock request has been rejected by a magistrate. Richards, 520 U.S. at 396 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. at 1422 n. 7; see Wasson, 615 N.W.2d at 322 (noting officers should reappraise the need for no-knock entry). Police here had already executed the search warrant at the 119 East Fourth address and had stopped the two cars identified in the warrant before they approached 1119 North Lake to execute the search warrant. At trial, Officer Jenkins testified that the officers were concerned that someone might have “tipped off’ the occupants of 1119 North Lake before they arrived. Therefore, an on-the-scene assessment would have provided additional support for the no-knock entry. III. Barnes argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was in constructive possession of the crack cocaine and marijuana found in the bedroom at 1119 North Lake. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and assume the jury believed the state’s evidence and discredited evidence to the contrary. State v. Steinbuch, 514 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn.1994). The conviction will not be reversed if the jury, given the state’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, could reasonably have found the defendant guilty. State v. Moore, 481 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Minn.1992). A person may constructively possess drugs jointly with another person. See Commissioner of Revenue v. Fort, 479 N.W.2d 43, 46 (Minn.1992); State v. Denison, 607 N.W.2d 796, 799 (Minn.App.2000), review denied (Minn. June 13, 2000). The totality of the circumstances must be assessed in determining whether the state has proved constructive possession. Denison, 607 N.W.2d at 800. Circumstantial evidence is entitled to as much weight as other evidence. State v. Webb, 440 N.W.2d 426, 430 (Minn.1989). A conviction based on circumstantial evidence merits stricter scrutiny, requiring that the circumstances proved must be inconsistent with a rational hypothesis of innocence. See State v. Walen, 563 N.W.2d 742, 750 (Minn.1997). But this court still must give deference to the jury’s ability to assess the circumstantial evidence. See State v. Bias, 419 N.W.2d 480, 484 (Minn.1988). The cocaine and marijuana were found in the bedroom Barnes was occupying at the time of the search. Moreover, his personal effects, including his driver’s license and a windbreaker that was too large to belong to Mathison, were found in close proximity to the cocaine, and police found cocaine in the pocket of Barnes’s shorts. There was ample evidence, including a purchase agreement in Barnes’s name found in the bedroom and Barnes’s listing 1119 North Lake as his residence on another purchase agreement, to establish that Barnes was at least a guest there. There was also ample evidence that Barnes was exercising joint dominion and control over the second-floor bedroom. But the strongest evidence against Barnes was the cocaine found in his shorts. We conclude that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Barnes constructively possessed the cocaine and marijuana. IV. Barnes argues that the marijuana and cocaine possession offenses, as well as the offense of giving a false name to police, were all part of a single behavioral incident, and, therefore, only one sentence should have been imposed. The state concedes that Count I (possession of cocaine with intent to sell) and Count III (possession of marijuana with intent to sell) were part of the same behavioral incident, and therefore the sentence on Count III should be vacated. The state, however, argues that giving a false name to police was separate from the drug possession conduct and therefore could be sentenced separately- Minnesota’s statutory double jeopardy protection precludes multiple sentencing for conduct that is part of a single behavioral incident. Minn.Stat. § 609.035, subd. 1 (1998). Whether multiple offenses arose out of a single behavioral incident depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. State v. Bookwalter, 541 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Minn.1995). The analysis focuses on whether the conduct occurred at the same time and place and whether there was a single criminal objective. See id. The state has the burden of showing that the conduct is not part of a single behavioral incident. State v. Clark, 486 N.W.2d 166, 171 (Minn.App.1992). Possession of two controlled substances at the same time and place, for personal use, constitutes a single behavioral incident. State v. Reese, 446 N.W.2d 173, 180 (Minn.App.1989), review denied (Minn. Nov. 15, 1989). Drug sales, even within a short period of time, may be considered separate behavioral incidents. See State v. Gould, 562 N.W.2d 518 (Minn.1997) (holding three sales of heroin on separate days within same week not single behavioral incident); State v. Soto, 562 N.W.2d 299, 304 (Minn.1997) (holding that multiple drug sales were not single behavioral incident). But Barnes was convicted for possession with intent to sell, not for selling. The marijuana and cocaine were both found in the bedroom, packaged for sale. The criminal objective in possessing them is the same, and there is no evidence indicating the marijuana was to be sold at different times or places than the cocaine. Therefore, Counts I and III were part of the same behavioral incident, and the sentence for Count III must be vacated. The state argues that a separate sentence was properly imposed on Count V, giving a false name to police. The state concedes that criminal conduct committed to avoid apprehension for another offense is generally considered part of the same behavioral incident. See State v. Gibson, 478 N.W.2d 496, 497 (Minn.1991). The state argues, however, that Barnes, who gave his brother’s name after he had been handcuffed in the bedroom where the cocaine was found, at a time when he was already under arrest, was not avoiding apprehension by giving a false name. The state argues that the most Barnes could hope for from this deception was to avoid apprehension if he was released pending trial. See State v. Nordby, 448 N.W.2d 878, 880 (Minn.App.1989) (holding that giving false information to police that could only give defendant “the slim hope of not being found if he did not appear in court on the citation” was a separate behavioral incident). The testimony at trial, however, was too vague to carry the state’s burden of proof on this issue. Officer Jenkins testified that Barnes was in handcuffs when he gave the false name. Barnes, however, could have been handcuffed merely to ensure that he would not interfere with the search, without being placed under formal arrest. Moreover, the search warrant authorized a search of the person of Garland Barnes. Barnes could have hoped to avoid a body search by means .of the false identification. The state has not shown that Barnes’s criminal objective was only to obtain some future advantage, as in Nord-by. Therefore, the sentence for Count V must be vacated. y. Barnes has filed a pro se supplemental brief raising a number of issues. His claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are presented without legal authority and need not be considered. See generally State v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521, 525 n. 1 (Minn.1995) (holding that claim raised on appeal without supporting argument or legal authority will not be considered unless prejudicial error is obvious from the record). We note, however, that Barnes’s claim that police “planted” the drugs found at 1119 North Lake and the cocaine found in his shorts appears to be so lacking in factual support that a reasonable defense counsel would not have raised the defense of entrapment. As to the claim of ineffective self-representation, Barnes was informed when he chose to represent himself that he would have difficulty, as an incarcerated person, in preparing for trial. The court has no duty to remove all obstacles from the path of a party choosing to represent himself. State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187 (Minn.1992). Barnes argues that double jeopardy barred his second trial after a mistrial was declared in the first trial due to the prosecutor’s failure to disclose a police report. But if a mistrial is declared at a defendant’s request due to prosecutorial misconduct, a second trial is not barred unless the misconduct was committed with the intent to provoke a mistrial. State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn.1985). The trial court declared a mistrial because the state had failed to disclose some police reports to Barnes that the prosecutor only discovered in the middle of trial. There is no indication that the prosecutor’s apparently inadvertent pretrial discovery violation was intended to provoke a mistrial. DECISION The search warrant was supported by probable cause. The no-knock provision in the warrant was supported by articulable suspicion that an announced entry would be dangerous. The evidence is sufficient to prove constructive possession of the drugs. The trial court erred in sentencing Barnes on Counts III and V, and those sentences are vacated. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.

OPINION HARTEN, Judge. Edward Wagner died from injuries sustained in an automobile accident after drinking beer purchased from respondent Schwegmann’s South Town Liquor, Inc. and becoming intoxicated. Appellants, Wagner’s family, allege a cause of action against respondent for an illegal sale of alcoholic beverages pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 340A.801 (1988). The trial court granted summary judgment for respondent. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. PACTS William Hughes and Jeffrey Eiffert, friends of decedent, gave depositions stating that they were present when a keg of beer was purchased from respondent by an adult friend of the decedent whose identity was unknown to them. One stated that an employee of defendant helped load the keg into their car. Gregory Platenberg stated in a deposition that he was not present when the alcohol was purchased and that he knew nothing about the purchase. In a later deposition, Platenberg changed his story, testifying that on March 10, 1989 he purchased a one-quarter keg of beer from respondent and carried it to decedent’s car, where decedent waited alone in the parking lot. At the time, Platenberg was 18 years of age. Platenberg showed respondent’s employee a Minnesota identification card bearing his picture, but the name and birth date of his 22-year-old brother, Brian. The address on the identification card was that of a friend of Platen-berg. Platenberg filled out a receipt for respondent printing Brian’s name, but, conspicuously, did not sign the receipt. Respondent’s other receipts of keg purchases from that day had signatures. The receipt was also used to make an imprint of the identification card. On the evening of March 10, 1989, decedent consumed beer from the keg. Decedent was involved in an automobile accident in the early morning of March 11, 1989, and died from injuries sustained in the accident. Family members of decedent brought this civil action under Minn.Stat. § 340A.801, alleging that respondent illegally sold alcoholic beverages to Platen-berg or an adult buying for a minor, which contributed to decedent’s intoxication and death. The trial court granted summary judgment for respondent. This appeal followed. ISSUES 1. Does the defense of reasonable reliance upon proof of age apply in this case? 2. Did the trial court err by determining that no material issue of fact existed? ANALYSIS 1. Minnesota law provides a cause of action against a person who illegally sells alcohol. Minn.Stat. § 340A.801. Unlike earlier versions of the law, the 1988 law in effect on the date of decedent’s accident did not explicitly provide to the alcohol vendor with a defense of reasonable reliance upon proof of purchaser’s age. The law was amended by 1989 Minn.Laws ch. 301, §§ 14-16 to include the defense effective August 1, 1989, after the accident which gave rise to the instant litigation. The amendment provides, (a) Proof of age for purchasing or consuming alcoholic beverages may be established only by a valid drivers license or Minnesota identification card * * *. (b) * * * [i]t is a defense * * * to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant reasonably and in good faith relied upon representations of proof of age authorized in paragraph (a) in selling, bartering, furnishing, or giving the alcoholic beverage. Minn.Stat. § 340A.503, subd. 6 (Supp.1989). This defense is applicable to civil actions. Minn.Stat. § 340A.801, subd. 3a (Supp. 1989). In a criminal case, the supreme court construed the 1986 version of the law, which also did not contain the reliance defense, to allow its use. State v. Neisen, 415 N.W.2d 326, 329 (Minn.1987). [I]t is a defense for the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she, in making the sale, relied on one of the forms of age identification described in subdivision 6 [of section 340A.503], and that such reliance was justified, undertaken prudently and carefully, and was in good faith. Id. We affirm the trial court’s interpretation of the statutes and case law and hold that the defense of reasonable reliance on proof of age is also applicable to civil causes of action under section 340A.801 (1988), and is available for respondent to use in this ease. Appellants allege that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing respondent to amend its pleadings to include the defense of reasonable reliance upon proof of age. Respondent argues that the trial court’s granting of the motion to amend is not an appealable issue. While granting of a motion to amend alone is not an appealable issue, in this case there was also a final judgment, and the scope of review from a final judgment is broad. The appellate court may review any order involving the merits or affecting the judgment. Minn.R.Civ.App.P. 103.04. Therefore, the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to amend is properly before this court. A party may amend pleadings with leave of the court, which “shall be freely given when justice so requires.” Minn. R.Civ.P. 15.01. The action of the trial court in granting or denying a motion for amendment will not be reversed except for a clear abuse of discretion. Warrick v. Giron, 290 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Minn.1980). The trial court correctly concluded that there was no sworn testimony indicating that a minor purchased the beer from respondent until Platenberg’s second deposition. There was no reason for respondent to plead the affirmative defense before this sworn testimony became available. Moreover, neither party was prejudiced because neither had filed notice of readiness to proceed to trial. Therefore, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the motion to amend. 2. Upon review of summary judgment, we must determine whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the trial erroneously applied the law. Betlach v. Wayzata Condominium, 281 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn.1979). All doubts and factual inferences must be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party. Nord v. Herreid, 305 N.W.2d 337, 339 (Minn.1981). Summary judgment should not be granted if reasonable persons might reach different conclusions after reviewing the evidence. Anderson v. Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 250 Minn. 167, 186, 84 N.W.2d 593, 605 (1957). Issues of material fact exist in three areas of this case: (1) whether respondent sold alcoholic beverages to Platenberg or to an adult, (2) if an adult purchased the alcohol, whether respondent knew that the adult was buying the alcohol for minors, and (3) if Platenberg purchased the alcohol, whether respondent reasonably relied upon the identification card as proof of age. The trial court weighed the evidence and concluded Platenberg’s version was correct. On a motion for summary judgment the trial court may not weigh the evidence. Murphy v. Country House, Inc., 307 Minn. 344, 351, 240 N.W.2d 507, 512 (1976). In opposition to Platenberg’s claim that he purchased the keg of beer using a fraudulently obtained identification card, Hughes and Eiffert testified that they were at the liquor store parking lot when an unidentified friend of decedent purchased the keg, and either the unidentified friend or respondent’s employee brought the keg to the car. Even under Platenberg’s version, the factual issue of whether respondent’s employees reasonably relied upon the identification card for proof of age is present. Pla-tenberg did not sign the respondent’s receipt, as all other customers purchasing kegs of beer did on that day. Platenberg may not have been able to sign Brian’s name convincingly while being watched. This evidence goes to whether respondent’s employee’s reliance upon the identification card was reasonable. Resolving all doubts and factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party, there are issues of material fact in dispute regarding circumstances of the purchase of the beer. See Nord, 305 N.W.2d at 339. Appellants must present affirmative evidence to defeat the motion for summary judgment. See Carlisle v. City of Minneapolis, 437 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Minn. App.1989). Respondent argues that appel lants did not present any evidence in response to Platenberg’s deposition testimony regarding his use of the fraudulently obtained identification card. However, the deposition testimony of Hughes and Eiffert contradicts Platenberg’s testimony as to who purchased the beer. We find that material issues of fact exist. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment for respondent. We reverse the summary judgment and remand. DECISION Summary judgment was inappropriate where material issues of fact exist regarding the purchase of the keg of beer. Upon remand, respondent may use a defense of reasonable reliance upon proof of age. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

ORDER WHEREAS, by its order dated June 16, 1992, this court suspended Harold L. Stol- pestad from the practice of law for a period of 30 days; and WHEREAS, Harold L. Stolpestad has filed with this court an affidavit stating that he has complied fully with the requirements for reinstatement set forth in this court's order of June 16, 1992; and WHEREAS, the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility has filed with this court an affidavit certifying that Harold L. Stolpestad substantially has complied with the requirements for reinstatement set forth in this court’s order of June 16, 1992; NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Harold L. Stolpestad is reinstated to the practice of law in the State of Minnesota effective July 15, 1992, at which time he shall be placed on supervised probation for a period of 2 years in accordance with the conditions enumerated by this court in its order of June 16, 1992.

ORDER WHEREAS, by order dated April 17, 1992, this court suspended Jeffrey R. Besi-kof from the practice of law for a period of 30 days; and WHEREAS, Jeffrey R. Besikof has filed with this court an affidavit stating that he has complied fully with the requirements for reinstatement set forth in the April 17, 1992, order; and WHEREAS, the Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility has filed with this court an affidavit certifying that Jeffrey R. Besikof has complied with the requirements for reinstatement set forth in the April 17, 1992, order. NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 1. Effective May 27, 1992, Jeffrey R. Besikof shall be reinstated to the practice of law in the State of Minnesota. 2. Upon reinstatement, Jeffrey R. Besi-kof shall be placed on supervised probation for a period of 2 years commencing May 27, 1992. 3. As a condition of his reinstatement, Jeffrey R. Besikof hereby is required to complete the professional responsibility portion of the multi-state bar examination by April 27, 1993.

OPINION SCHUMACHER, Judge Respondent Barbara Swaden Rosen sued appellants PRIMUS Automotive Financial Services, Inc., d/b/a Subaru American Credit, and Ford Motor Credit, alleging that they violated Section 9-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code in connection with an automobile leasing transaction. The district court denied the motions for summary judgment and for reconsideration of PRIMUS and Ford Motor Credit and granted Rosen’s motion for partial summary judgment. We reverse and remand. FACTS On August 27, 1994, Rosen and/or respondent DCT Corporation leased a car from Brooklyn Park Automotive, Inc. (the dealer). As part of the transaction, Rosen paid the dealer a $350 security deposit. The dealer assigned the lease to Subaru American Credit, a trade name for PRI-MUS Automotive Financial Services, Inc. At the time, PRIMUS was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Ford Motor Credit. In 1996, Rosen terminated the lease and her security deposit was credited in full to her account at a different dealer. On February 19, 1998, Rosen filed a class action lawsuit against PRIMUS for breach of contract. Rosen claimed that the security deposit qualified as collateral under U.C.C § 9-207 (Minn.Stat. § 336.9-207 (1998)), and that PRIMUS had violated that statute by failing to return any “increase or profit” on the security deposit. The district court later granted Rosen leave to amend the complaint to add DCT as a plaintiff and Ford Motor Credit as a defendant and certified the case as a class action. (Because the class action aspects of the case are not relevant to our decision, we refer to Rosen as respondent in this opinion.) The district court denied several motions by PRIMUS and Ford Motor Credit to dismiss and for summary judgment. On February 3, 2000, however, after these rulings, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided State v. Larson, 605 N.W.2d 706, 712 (Minn.2000), holding that a dealer’s receipt of an automobile security deposit in a commercial leasing transaction creates a debt- or-creditor relationship between the dealer and consumer. Based on the supreme court’s decision in Larson, PRIMUS and Ford Motor Credit moved the district court for reconsideration and summary judgment. The district court denied the motion, stating that “the general rule stated in Larson does not apply to the case at hand.” The court went on to grant partial summary judgment to Rosen, holding that “the deposit does constitute collateral under U.C.C. § 9-207 as a matter of law.” ISSUE Did the trial court err by failing to apply Larson’s holding that an automobile dealer’s receipt of a security deposit in a commercial leasing transaction creates a debt- or-creditor relationship between the dealer and consumer? ANALYSIS Rosen’s main contention is that the $350 security deposit paid in connection with the automobile lease was “collateral” with in the meaning of the U.C.C. By returning only the $350, with no interest or other increase, Rosen alleges that PRIMUS and Ford Motor Credit violated U.C.C. § 9-207. That section provides that absent an agreement to the contrary, when a secured party holds collateral, the secured party may hold as additional security any increase or profits (except money) received from the collateral, but money so received, unless remitted to the debtor, shall be applied in reduction of the secured obligation * * *. Minn.Stat. § 336.9-207(2)(c) (1998). But the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in Larson that an automobile dealer’s receipt of a security deposit in a commercial leasing transaction creates a debtor-creditor relationship between the dealer and consumer. In Larson, the defendant, owner of an automobile and equipment leasing business, failed to repay numerous customers’ lease security deposits. Larson, 605 N.W.2d at 708. Larson was convicted of three counts of theft by temporary taking. Id. at 709. Larson challenged the convictions, arguing that the security deposits were not “property of another.” Id. at 710. In analyzing this contention, the supreme court looked to landlord-tenant law for guidance and reviewed three different ways of characterizing the nature of security deposits: the “debtor-creditor model,” the “pledgor-pledgee” model, and the trust model. Id. at 712. The court observed that a “majority of jurisdictions apply the debtor-creditor model to security deposits when analyzing landlord-tenant relationships.” Id. Ultimately, the court concluded that Minnesota would “join the majority of states in defining the lessor-lessee security deposit relationship as one of debtor to creditor.” Id. PRIMUS and Ford Motor Credit argue that if the “lessor-lessee security deposit relationship [is] one of debtor to creditor,” then Minn.Stat. § 336.9-207, which applies to secured parties holding collateral, is inapplicable, and Rosen’s lawsuit must be dismissed. Rosen argues, however, that the Larson decision did not consider any specific contractual language in reaching its holding and that the contractual language in the lease clearly establishes a secured creditor relationship, thus distinguishing this case from Larson. The lease contract Rosen signed contained the following provision: Any security deposit held by the Lessor under this Lease may be used to pay all costs that the Lessee should pay under this Lease but does not. Rosen argues that because the lease provides that the security deposit is to be “held” by the lessee and “used to pay all costs” for which the lessee is liable but does not pay, the security deposit meets the statutory definition of a security interest, which is “an interest in personal property ⅜ * ⅜ which secures payment or performance of an obligation.” Minn.Stat. § 336 .1-201(37) (1998). Rosen further argues that the “word ‘held’ does not indicate an intent to transfer title.” But the supreme court specifically rejected the secured creditor/collateral interpretation of an automobile lease security deposit in Larson. Although the supreme court was well aware of the interpretation Rosen urges, the court rejected it in favor of the debtor-creditor model. Larson, 605 N.W.2d at 712. Despite Rosen’s argument, the use of the word “held” does not negate an intent to' transfer title to the security deposit. As the supreme court observed, in the debtor-creditor model, the “security deposit is described as held for the benefit of the lessor because it protects the lessor’s vulnerability under the lease.” Id. (emphasis added). In Larson, the supreme court “defin[edj the lessor-lessee security deposit relationship as one of debtor to creditor.” Id. (emphasis added). The supreme court’s ruling was based not on specific contractual language, but on the nature of the relationship created by an automobile lease security deposit. Because nothing in the typically sparse contractual language in Larson’s lease changes the nature of that relationship, the rule announced in Larson applies. PRIMUS and Ford Motor Credit are therefore entitled to summary judgment. DECISION The district court erred in granting partial summary judgment to Rosen and in denying summary judgment to PRIMUS and Ford Motor Credit. Reversed and remanded.

OPINION CRIPPEN, Judge. Appellant Bonnie Lutzi asked the trial court to modify the “visitation schedule” for the two minor children of the parties. An earlier decree named appellant as physical custodian of the children. Because the decree provided for visitation during alternating weeks and alternating holidays, the trial court granted respondent John Lutzi’s countermotion to amend the decree to provide that custody is placed in a “shared physical custody arrangement.” The court also denied appellant’s proposed changes in the arrangement. Appellant challenges the trial court’s amendment of the judgment and contends she is entitled to have visitation altered. We reverse the judgment amendment but affirm denial of appellant’s motion. FACTS The marriage of Bonnie Lutzi and John Lutzi was dissolved in 1988. Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the trial court judgment provided that the parties have joint legal custody of their two minor sons, now ages six and eight, but that appellant Bonnie Lutzi have “the physical custody of the minor children.” Another provision of the stipulated judgment provided that “as visitation” the children should spend “alternating weeks and alternating holidays” with each parent. The parties have adhered to the judgment and have enjoyed equal periods of custodial child care. The record furnishes a meager disclosure of the living circumstances of the parties. Before the marriage dissolution the family lived in Kasson, a city about 13 miles west of Rochester. The oldest child has attended school in Byron, located east of Kasson, five miles nearer to Rochester. Bonnie Lutzi has engaged in real estate sales work since 1985, evidently in the Kasson or Byron areas. She describes plans to sell real estate in the “Stewartville area.” Stewart-ville is located about 10 miles south of Rochester, some 22 miles from Byron and 27 miles from Kasson. Appellant has not indicated where she plans to live, but says she plans to have the children attend school at Chatfield, a city about 16 miles east of Stewartville. Because of her plans to change the school of the children, appellant moved in July 1991 for an order altering the visitation schedule established in the decree, asking that she have custody during the school year and visitation for at least two weeks during the summer. John Lutzi opposed this motion and moved, inter alia, that the decree be amended to state that custody of the children is placed in a “shared physical custody arrangement.” The trial court determined that judgment provisions on custody and visitation were ambiguous and ordered an amendment to state an arrangement of shared physical custody. On affidavits filed by the parties, the court denied alteration of the arrangement, observing that (1) the standard for altering a “joint physical custody” arrangement is one of endangerment, and (2) appellant “fails to demonstrate that it is in the best interest of the minor children that the presently existing shared physical custody arrangement be disrupted.” Explaining its latter finding, the court observed special needs of the oldest child and the successful meeting of those needs in the Byron school system. On appeal, Bonnie Lutzi argues that the decree clearly gives her rights as the sole physical custodian. She ends her brief with the conclusion, without elaboration, that she is “entitled” to continued sole custody rights and “to relocate [the children] to her new residence.” ISSUES 1. Did the trial court err in denominating the custody arrangement as one of shared or joint physical custody? 2. If appellant was the sole custodian, did the trial court err in denying her request for custody during the school year? ANALYSIS Contentions of the parties require an attempt to define shared physical custody arrangements and to ascertain their legal significance. In spite of continuing uncertainty on the topic, we find authority for reasonably settled standards governing the issues of this case. 1. The trial court amended the judgment in this case because of its interpretation of provisions on custody and visitation, not because of a change of circumstances. Consistent with the original judgment, the parties have enjoyed an equal division of custodial time for nearly three years. The trial court found little guidance from the governing statutes. Joint physical custody is defined by statute as a placement where residence and routine daily care “is structured between the parties.” Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(d) (1990). Clearly, however, sole physical custody with visitation also results in structuring the residence and care of the children between the parties. Thus, trial courts may unequally divide physical custody but still label the arrangement as joint. Courts may choose, as some do, to designate joint physical custodians as primary and secondary joint custodians. The trial court’s conclusions reflect an understanding, not stated in the statute, that joint physical custody traditionally involves an equal sharing of residential care. Thus, the court could conclude that an equal sharing of physical custody not only looks like, but is in fact a joint custody arrangement. We have previously denied the claim of a “de facto” joint physical custody placement, but this holding occurred in circumstances where the noncustodial parent enjoyed only a liberal visitation schedule. Geiger v. Geiger, 470 N.W.2d 704, 706 (Minn.App.1991), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 1, 1991). Geiger did not denounce the notion that a still larger visitation arrangement might make the noncustodial parent a de facto joint physical custodian. We conclude it is not necessary to determine in this case whether or under what circumstances a de facto joint custody arrangement might arise. There is also no occasion here to decide appellant’s proposition that such a determination may require an evidentiary hearing to explore the intention of the court in its judgment on custody. Instead, the issue in this case is resolved by observing that the 1988 custody arrangement was not independently determined by the trial court but reflected a stipulation by the parties. The existence of a stipulated decree is a critical consideration because of statutory language on definitions of custodial arrangements. The definitions statute provides in its preface that the statute provides definitions which govern “unless otherwise agreed by the parties.” Minn.Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3. The parties agreed in 1988 that respondent would have an equal caring role but that appellant would be designated the physical custodian. Taking into account the express statutory reference to an agreement of the parties, as well as the inexact definition of physical custody (physical custody “structured between the parties”), we conclude that the courts must accept the denomination of custody stipulated by the parties. Thus, the trial court erred in modifying the judgment to reconcile perceived ambiguities in its provisions. 2. Evidently tied to the contention she is sole physical custodian of the children, appellant concludes that she is entitled, without limitation, to change the structure of the arrangement because of her move to a new residence somewhere near Stewart-ville, some 27 miles from the former family home in Kasson. Respondent criticizes appellant’s notion that she can “change the [visitation] schedule at her whim.” Respondent contends that this result will be avoided by viewing the judgment as one for joint physical custody. Alternatively, respondent contends that appellant as sole custodian cannot change the visitation arrangement as she proposes without establishing that the present arrangement endangers the health or development of the children. See Minn.Stat. § 518.18(d)(iii) (1990). a. Endangerment standard. The trial court concluded that appellant’s proposed restructuring of custody required a showing of endangerment. It appears this view was linked with the court’s con- elusion that the arrangement was one of joint physical custody. Appellant disputes the court’s legal conclusion, but she does not claim to have proved or made even a prima facie showing that the present custodial arrangement endangers the welfare of the children. The trial court correctly identified the standard governing alteration of a joint physical custody arrangement. 1991 legislation provides that the courts shall apply the endangerment standards set forth in Minn.Stat. § 518.18(d) when “deciding whether to modify a prior joint custody order.” 1991 Minn. Laws ch. 266, § 1 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 518.18(e)). We have found neither precedent nor reason suggesting a joint custody order is modified by an insubstantial adjustment of the arrangement to deal with ordinary changes in the circumstances of children and their parents. Here, however, appellant proposed to alter an arrangement from equal care to one where she has custody during the entire school year. This alteration, as it regarded a joint custody arrangement, is specifically the kind of change the legislature wished to limit. We have observed before that the 1991 enactment was intended to contradict this court’s earlier decision in Klecker v. Klecker, 454 N.W.2d 264 (Minn.App.1990). See Dabrowski v. Dabrowski, 477 N.W.2d 761, 764-65 (Minn. App. 1991) (legislation shows disagreement with our earlier construction of section 518.18). In Klecker, we determined that the best interest standard, not the endangerment standard, governed change of an equal care arrangement to give one parent custodial care for nine months. Klecker, 454 N.W.2d at 266-67. The 1991 statute also appears to correct the statement in Hegerle v. Hegerle, 355 N.W.2d 726, 731-32 (Minn.App.1984), that alteration of an equal share arrangement to a school year-summer division constituted only a reworking of the joint custody arrangement, not a change of custody. Although the traditional best interest standard may still govern insubstantial alterations, the endangerment standard must be employed where a party proposes full custody during the school year after having previously shared custody on an equal basis. Dabrowski confirms the application of the statute to a substantial joint custody modification, a proposal for full custody by a parent who previously cared for children during thirty-six percent of the time. Respondent contends, we think correctly, that the endangerment standard governs the case even if appellant is denominated a sole physical custodian. Here also, less substantial alterations of visitation rights are governed by the best interests standard. See Danielson v. Danielson, 393 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Minn.App.1986) (alteration of visitation accompanying change of custodial parent’s residence is not a “restriction” of visitation under Minn.Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5). Subject to an exception governing more substantial reductions of visitation, modification of visitation is to occur whenever it would serve the best interests of the child. Minn.Stat. § 518.-175, subd. 5 (1990). If, however, the court chooses to “restrict” visitation rights, an action involving greater alteration of visitation rights, the statute demands trial court findings that visitation is likely to endanger the child’s health or development. Id.; see Clark v. Clark, 346 N.W.2d 383, 385-86 (Minn.App.1984) (restrictions order reversed; remand for reinstatement of former visitation). Thus, although appellant in this case was the sole physical custodian of the children, the visitation changes she proposes are governed by the endangerment standard. Moreover, we conclude that appellant’s present motion cannot succeed, even if the endangerment standard did not govern her motion. The court in this case showed respect for the endangerment standard but also proceeded to make specific findings indicating that the proposed visitation alterations were not shown to be in the best interests of the children. These findings are supported by the record. Appellant has made no showing that the children would be hurt by a commuting arrangement needed to permit their attendance at the Byron schools. We also note that appellant's affidavit speaks to concerns regarding respondent’s cooperation and his provision for the medical care of the children. These statements lack specificity and substance and do not compel a finding that the best interests of the children are threatened. Finally, respondent showed and the trial court found that an educational opportunity for the oldest child at Byron should be preserved. This important consideration has added weight because the parties are joint legal custodians, giving respondent an equally important role in determining the education of the children. See Minn.Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(b) (defining joint legal custody); cf Minn.Stat. § 518.176, subd. 1 (1990); Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn.1983) (applying section 518.176, subdivision 1). b. Evidentiary hearing. To review appellant’s contention on her rights as sole custodian, we must also address the question of whether she was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on her motion. The trial court held that the matter could be determined without an eviden-tiary hearing. Here again, the court’s holding was shaped by its conclusion that it dealt with modification of joint custody. A party is entitled to an evidentiary hearing when confronted with the other parent’s motion to change a judgment on child custody. Thompson v. Thompson, 238 Minn. 41, 43-44, 55 N.W.2d 329, 331 (1952) (quoting a rule stated in 27 C.J.S. Divorce § 317c(6) (1936)); Hummel v. Hummel, 304 N.W.2d 19, 20-21 (Minn. 1981). Coinciding with this principle, a proponent of change is entitled to an evidentia-ry hearing upon showing a prima facie case for the requested modification. Nice-Petersen v. Nice-Petersen, 310 N.W.2d 471, 472 (Minn.1981). Minnesota cases have not clarified whether these “change of custody” holdings govern either change in the allocation of time between joint physical custodians or the alteration of visitation arrangements. We conclude, largely paralleling our analysis on the need to show endangerment, that the Nice-Petersen doctrine governs a proposal for substantial changes of time allocation, both for joint physical custody and visitation situations. 1991 legislation on modification of joint physical custody treats the topic exactly as any other proposal for change of custody. 1991 Minn.Laws ch. 266, § 1 (codified at Minn.Stat. § 518.18(e)). This statute requires correction of our statement in He-gerle, 355 N.W.2d at 732, that an evidentia-ry hearing on major alteration of a sharing arrangement is merely preferable. We see no appreciable difference in the law governing substantial modifications of visitation. Here again, substantial restriction of visitation is treated by statute with the same seriousness as changes of custody. See Minn.Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5. We also note digest authority, similar to that quoted by the supreme court in Thompson, treating visitation issues in the same fashion as custody questions. See 27C C.J.S. Divorce § 639 (1986). Appellant proposes a major alteration of the custodial care arrangement. This is significant because we are confronted with ample authority to limit the use of eviden-tiary hearings on insubstantial alterations. See Minn.R.Civ.P. 43.05 (trial court role in directing scope of evidence); Saturnini v. Saturnini, 260 Minn. 494, 496, 110 N.W.2d 480, 482 (1961) (quoting Strom v. Montana Cent. Ry., 81 Minn. 346, 349, 84 N.W. 46, 47 (1900), stating need for exercise of discretion to confine occurrence of evidentiary hearings). As stated previously, 1991 legislation on joint custody modifications is directed at eases where we employed the best interests standard to determine major time-share alterations. See Dabrowski, 477 N.W.2d at 764-65; Klecker, 454 N.W.2d at 266-68. There is also precedent for making ordinary adjustments of visitation without an evidentiary hearing. See Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 397, 400 (removal from state may be permitted without a hearing, and trial court has obligation in these situations to make appropriate modifications of visitation). Finally, as stated before, change of visitation in an Auge situation, even though it reduces visitation contact, does not con stitute the “restriction” of visitation limited under Minn.Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5. Danielson, 393 N.W.2d at 407. We held last year that the concept of Auge applied where liberal visitation rights must be modified significantly, but where the severity of modification was reduced by the fact that removal was made only to nearby North Dakota. Geiger, 470 N.W.2d at 706-08. Thus, appellant’s substantial modification proposal came within the scope of Thompson and Nice-Petersen. If supported by a prima facie showing of cause, appellant was entitled to a hearing. However, we conclude the trial court did not wrongfully deny an evidentiary hearing on the record in this case. Appellant did not succeed in demonstrating a prima facie case for the modification she proposed. She failed to show that continuation of the present custodial arrangement would be dangerous or even harmful to the children’s welfare. She neither claimed nor showed that those arrangements would create any significant hardship for her. Allegations in regard to health care and cooperation on the part of respondent were inconclusive. In addition, we note that the record contains no written demand by appellant for an evidentiary hearing. See Minn.Gen.R.Prac. 303.03(d) (derived in part from Minn.R.Fam.Ct. 2.04). c. Auge and moving rights of custodial parent. To complete an analysis of appellant’s rights as a sole custodian, we must determine whether her motion is governed by different substantive and procedural rules because of the presumption favoring a custodial parent’s proposal to move a child’s residence to a place more distant from the noncustodial parent’s home. See Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 398-400 (on occasion of custodial parent’s plan to move from Minnesota to Hawaii, court to presume that removal will be permitted, with visitation adjusted as needed to protect the noncustodial parent’s relationship with the child; right to move cannot be denied without an evidentiary hearing). Auge has been applied in another case which may have involved a significant reduction in visitation contacts. Geiger, 470 N.W.2d at 706-08 (applying Auge even where noncustodial parent has enjoyed liberal visitation contact, but where custodian’s move is to the neighboring state of North Dakota). Geiger leads reasonably to the similar conclusion that a joint custodian with somewhat less than equal contact with the children might also suffer substantial loss of contact under Auge. Cf. Hegerle, 355 N.W.2d at 731 (Auge found inapplicable where joint custodians have enjoyed equal caretaking opportunity). For several reasons, Auge does not govern appellant’s circumstances, even though she has sole physical custody. First, appellant has neither demonstrated nor claimed that her move to the Stewartville area precludes continuation of the prior custody arrangement. Thus, unlike the situation in Auge, denial of appellant’s proposed changes is not shown to involve a loss of her prior custodial rights. In fact, appellant has not clarified the nature or extent of her inconvenience in permitting the children to attend school in Byron, located some 22 miles from Stewartville. Second, as already noted, it has been previously established that an equally shared custody arrangement precludes application of Auge. Hegerle, 355 N.W.2d at 731. Although Hegerle dealt with joint physical caretaking, we see no basis to distinguish it from an identical arrangement labeled differently. Finally, although Auge establishes presumptive rights for a custodial parent, it permits defeat of the presumption and a resulting change of custody without a showing the move would endanger the child. Rather, the presumption is overcome on a showing that the move contradicts the child’s best interests. Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 397-99. Here the trial court found the best interests of the children were served in their present school enrollment. DECISION The trial court erred in amending the judgment to provide for joint physical custody, and we reverse the amendment. Although appellant is rightfully judged the sole physical custodian, this does not significantly enhance her rights in comparison to a joint custodian in similar circumstances, and the trial court did not err in denying her proposed alterations of visitation. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. . Under Minn.Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3 (1990), removal of the child to another state, absent consent by the noncustodial parent, cannot occur without a court order. This subdivision states no standard governing judicial decisions on removal requests. The subdivision governs cases where "the noncustodial parent has been given visitation rights,” making it evident that the court's attention should focus on the effects of removal on visitation rights. See Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 397. Auge and Danielson make it evident that ordinary visitation issues are to be determined according to the child’s best interests, reflecting the general rules of Minn.Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5 on modification of visitation rights. . Auge arose due to the statutory provision requiring court approval where the custodial parent proposes to move the residence of the child to another state and the other parent withholds consent for the move. Minn.Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3. Read alone, this provision might imply a superior right of the sole custodian to move within the state, seemingly permitted without court approval. Where, however, a proposed move substantially alters a prior equal care arrangement, the move constitutes a restriction of visitation governed by Minn.Stat. § 518.175, subd. 5.

OPINION EDWARD D. MULALLY, Judge. Appellant University of Minnesota (“University”) challenges the decisions of the Commissioner of Veterans Affairs and a district court which determined that the Veterans Preference Act applies to the Uni versity of Minnesota. The appeals were consolidated. We affirm. FACTS Respondent Roger L. Winberg is an honorably discharged veteran. He applied for various positions with the University and was not hired. In March 1991, he petitioned the Commissioner of Veterans Affairs for relief, alleging the University had violated the Veterans Preference Act (“Act”). A hearing was held before an administrative law judge (“AU”). The AU recommended the University revise its' hiring practices to comply with the Act. The Commissioner of Veterans Affairs adopted that recommendation. The University petitioned for writ of certiorari and filed notice of appeal. Respondent George Martin, Jr. is an honorably discharged veteran who has been employed by the University since 1960 in the Facilities Management Department. During a reorganization, he was notified he would be laid off. Martin sought relief in a district court and received a permanent injunction against the University preventing a layoff until he was granted a veterans preference hearing. The University filed notice of appeal and moved for consolidation of the appeals, which this court granted. ISSUES 1. Does the Veterans Preference Act apply to appellant University of Minnesota? 2. Does application of the Veterans Preference Act to appellant University of Minnesota violate the Minnesota Constitution? 3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by permanently enjoining the University from laying off respondent Martin until a veterans preference hearing was held? ANALYSIS The decision in the Winberg ease was made by the Commissioner of Veterans Affairs. While agency decisions are presumed correct, upon review an appellate court is not bound by the agency’s decision when statutory interpretation is involved. Arvig Tel. Co. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 270 N.W.2d 111, 114 (Minn.1978); Henry v. Metropolitan Waste Control Comm’n, 401 N.W.2d 401, 404 (Minn.App. 1987). The decision in the Martin case was made by a district court judge. In granting an injunction preventing the University from laying off Martin, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that the Veterans Preference Act applies to the University. Conclusions of law are not binding upon an appellate court. Frost-Benco Elec. Ass’n v. Minnesota Public Util. Comm’n, 358 N.W.2d 639, 642 (Minn.1984); Minnesota Daily v. University of Minn., 432 N.W.2d 189, 191 (Minn.App.1988), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 25, 1989). Therefore, the standard of review for this consolidated appeal is de novo review of a conclusion of law. I. Applicability The Veterans Preference Act provides a preference for veterans in hiring for public employment in Minnesota. A veteran is entitled to preference points during the hiring process. Minn.Stat. §§ 43A.11, 197.455 (1990). An eligible veteran who is not hired is entitled to written notification of the reasons for the rejection. Minn.Stat. § 197.46 (1990). Respondent Winberg alleges the University violated these portions of the Act by not awarding him veterans preference points during the hiring process and not providing written notification. A veteran is also entitled to a hearing before being removed from public employment. Id. Respondent Martin alleges the University violated this portion of the Act by not granting him a veterans preference hearing. The University’s response in both cases is that the Act does not apply to the University of Minnesota. The University is not specifically included or excluded from the Act. Under Minn.Stat. § 197.455, the Act applies to a county, city, town, school district, or other municipality or political subdivision of this state. The trial court and the Commissioner found the University was a “political subdivision” within the meaning of the statute. The Act does not define the term “political subdivision.” This court has used the statutory definition found in Minn.Stat. § 471.49, subd. 3 (1982) to determine whether a watershed district was a political subdivision. Dahle v. Red Lake Watershed Dist., 354 N.W.2d 604, 606 (Minn.App. 1984). Minn.Stat. § 471.49, subd. 3 defines “political subdivision” as: any agency or unit of this state which now is, or hereafter shall be, authorized to levy taxes or empowered to cause taxes to be levied. Since watershed districts could levy taxes, the court found they were political subdivisions and therefore the Veterans Preference Act applied to employees hired by such districts. Dahle, 354 N.W.2d at 606. The trial court found the definition used in Dahle was not controlling, relying upon Henry, 401 N.W.2d at 406, which concluded metropolitan commissions are political subdivisions and are subject to the Veterans Preference Act. The Henry court did not use the definition of “political subdivision” used in Dahle regarding the ability of the entity to tax. The trial court found that because metropolitan commissions cannot tax, the definition of “political subdivision” used in Dahle is not controlling. The University argues metropolitan commissions do have the ability to tax, at least indirectly. The Metropolitan Waste Control Commission, at issue in Henry, does not have the power to tax; but the Metropolitan Council may certify an amount due the commission from a local government unit and the county auditor for the county where the unit is located shall levy taxes for payment to the commission. Minn.Stat. § 473.521, subd. 4 (1990). Under Minn. Stat. § 473.13, subd. 2 (1990), the Metropolitan Council may levy taxes. Other metropolitan commissions also seem to have at least an indirect power to tax. See Minn. Stat. §§ 473.446, subd. 1 (transit tax levies), 473.592, subd. 1 (local sales tax), 473.-595, subd. 1 (admission tax) (1990). While the trial court may have incorrectly distinguished Henry based upon the power to tax, we find the definition of political subdivision relied upon in Dahle is too narrow a definition for the application of the Veterans Preference Act. That definition was taken from a chapter pertaining to municipal rights, powers and duties only. The statutory definitions differ within the context of the statute. In addition, the Act applies to other political subdivisions which do not have the power to tax, such as a regional corrections board. See AFSCME Council 96 v. Arrowhead Regional Corrections Bd., 356 N.W.2d 295, 298 (Minn. 1984). The term “political subdivision” is defined several times in various chapters of Minnesota Statutes. “Political subdivision” is defined very broadly in Minn.Stat. § 355.01, subd. 10 (1990) as: any political subdivision as defined in section 218(b) of the Social Security Act, and includes any instrumentality of the state, any instrumentality of one or more of its political subdivisions including the League of Minnesota Municipalities, any instrumentality of the state and one or more of its political subdivisions, and an instrumentality established under an agreement pursuant to section 471.59 wherein the instrumentality is responsible for the employment and payment of the salaries of employees of the instrumentality. This definition includes the University. We hold the University of Minnesota is included in the term “political subdivision” for purposes of the Veterans Preference Act. The Act does not need to specifically list the University for the Act to apply. For example, the Human Rights Act and the Open Meeting Law apply to the University, neither of which specifically lists the University. The Open Meeting Law applies to “any state agency, board, commission or department * * * governing body of any school district * * * county, city, town or other public body.” Minn.Stat. § 471.705, subd. 1 (1990). The law was found to apply to the University. Minnesota Daily, 432 N.W.2d at 191. The Human Rights Act applies to any employer including the state and its departments, agencies, and political subdivisions. Minn.Stat. § 363.01, subds. 17, 28 (1990). The University admits it is subject to this law. See City of Minneapolis Comm’n on Civil Rights v. University of Minn., 356 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Minn. App.1984). We find no reason to differentiate the general definition of applicability found in the Veterans Preference Act from those used in the Open Meeting Law and the Human Rights Act. The Commissioner alternatively found the University was a state agency within the meaning of Minn.Stat. ch. 43A. Section 43A. 11 gives preference to veterans in the state civil service. The University has been called a state agency. See Miller v. Chou, 257 N.W.2d 277, 278 (Minn.1977). However, “agency” within the meaning of chapter 43A is defined as “a department, commission, board, institution, or other employing entity of the civil service.” Minn. Stat. § 43A.02, subd. 2 (1990). The University is specifically excluded from the definition of executive branch in Minn.Stat. § 43A.02, subd. 22 (1990). The Act does not apply to the University through chapter 43A. II. Constitutionality The University was created by University Charter in 1851 by the legislative assembly of the Territory of Minnesota. Bailey v. University of Minn., 290 Minn. 359, 360, 187 N.W.2d 702, 703 (1971). The government of the University was vested in a Board of Regents. University Charter, Laws 1851, ch. 3, § 3. In 1857, the Minnesota Constitution was adopted, which perpetuated the powers the Regents possessed. The Regents have the power to govern, control, and manage. State ex rel. Sholes v. University of Minn., 236 Minn. 452, 455, 54 N.W.2d 122, 125 (1952); State ex rel. Univ. of Minn. v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 265, 220 N.W. 951, 954 (1928). The University argues application of the Act to the University would violate the Minnesota Constitution by infringing upon the power of the Regents to govern the University. The supreme court has recognized the state legislature has no authority to direct academic policy or administration by law. Chase, 175 Minn. at 265, 220 N.W. at 953. However, the University has limits on its autonomy. The legislature may condition appropriations which would be binding if the Regents accept the appropriation. Id. The supreme court held the state designer selection board act was constitutional as applied to the University. Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Lord, 257 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Minn.1977). The court found the limited conditions placed upon state appropriations for construction projects in the act were valid. Id. The limited conditions imposed by the state designer selection board act are radically different from the direct attempt to control all university expenditures dealt with in the Chase case. Moreover, times have greatly changed since 1928 when the Chase case was decided. At that time the University of Minnesota was largely self-supporting insofar as operating revenues were concerned, and its building requirements from the legislature were relatively modest. Today, on the other hand, the University of Minnesota receives hundreds of millions of dollars in legislative appropriations each biennium for operations and building needs. In light of this fact alone, the legislature must by necessity be said to have the right to impose reasonable, even though limited, conditions on the use of such sizeable appropriations of public funds. Id. The Veterans Preference Act is not directly tied to appropriations. However, public money is being used to fund public employment at the University. Public policy supports the application of the Act to that public employment. The legislature gave a preference to veterans in public employment in the state of Minnesota, [rjecognizing that training and experience in the military services of- the government and loyalty and sacrifice for the government are qualifications of merit which cannot be readily assessed by examination. Minn.Stat. § 43A.11 (1990). Other reasons recognized to justify giving veterans preference in public employment are that the state owes veterans for serving their country, which interrupted their lives, and veterans are likely to possess characteristics necessary for public office. Koelfgen v. Jackson, 355 F.Supp. 243, 251 (D.Minn. 1972), aff'd, 410 U.S. 976, 93 S.Ct. 1502, 36 L.Ed.2d 173 (1973). The legislature has clearly manifested its intent that veterans enjoy security in public employment, protected from “the ravages and insecurity of a political spoils system.” AFSCME Council, 356 N.W.2d at 298 (quoting Johnson v. Village of Cohasset, 263 Minn. 425, 435, 116 N.W.2d 692, 699 (1962)). Application of the Act to the University would not infringe upon the Regents’ academic autonomy since the Act would not apply to academic positions. The Act only applies to nonacademic, nonconfidential, non-policymaking positions, such as respondent Martin’s position in the University’s Facilities Management Department. Similarly, the Act applies to school districts, but it specifically excludes teachers. Minn. Stat. § 197.46. The Act would not apply to professors, faculty, instructors, administrators, or even teaching assistants. We hold application of the Act to the University does not infringe upon its constitutional powers. III. Injunction The trial court granted a permanent injunction preventing the University from laying off respondent Martin until a veterans preference hearing was held. The decision to issue an injunction is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed without a showing of abuse of discretion. Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assoc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 91 (Minn.1979). The legal remedy must be inadequate and the injunction must be necessary to prevent irreparable injury. Id. at 92. Reinstatement and back pay have been adequate remedies at law for loss of employment. See Miller v. Foley, 317 N.W.2d 710, 713 (Minn.1982); see also Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 90, 94 S.Ct. 937, 952-53, 39 L.Ed.2d 166 (1974) (loss of employment not irreparable injury). However, the Veterans Preference Act provides for an additional right, that of a hearing before dismissal, for which money damages would not compensate. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by enjoining the University from laying off Martin until he was granted his right to a veterans preference hearing. DECISION The University of Minnesota violated the provisions of the Veterans Preference Act requiring a public employer to grant preference to veterans during the hiring process and to conduct a hearing before dismissing a veteran. Application of the Veterans Preference Act to the University of Minnesota’s nonacademic employees does not violate the Minnesota Constitution. The trial court’s injunction enjoining the University of Minnesota from laying off respondent Martin until a veterans preference act is held was not an abuse of discretion. Affirmed. Retired judge of the district court, acting as judge of the Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn.Const. art. VI, § 2.

LORING, Justice. This was a proceeding for the acquisition and improvement for park purposes of block 20 in the “town of Minneapolis” pursuant to L. 1911, c. 185, as later amended, generally known as the Elwell law. Benefits were assessed upon the real property of the Minneapolis & St. Louis Railroad Company, and that company appealed to the district court from the assessment made by the commissioners. Pursuant to the provisions of § 3 of the act, the district court thereupon appointed three commissioners to reassess the railroad company’s property. These commissioners viewed the property, heard the evidence, and arrived at the same assessment of benefits as that assessed by the first set of commissioners. They duly made their report, and after a hearing thereon the district court confirmed the report and the assessment so made. The case comes here upon appeal from the judgment entered pursuant to the court’s final order. No question is raised as to the regularity of the proceedings. The appellant in its brief contends that there could be no legal assessment made against its property for the reason that no benefits accrue thereto by reason of the improvement, for the uses to which it is put; that this property has been and will permanently be devoted to railroad purposes, its most valuable use, and the only one to which it is reasonably adapted; that its value for such railroad purposes is greatly in excess of the market value of the property adjacent thereto; and that consequently there can be no increase of market valúe by reason of the improvement of block 20. However, upon the oral argument this position was abandoned, and it was admitted that the situation comes within the decision in In re Improvement of Superior Street, 172 Minn. 554, 216 N. W. 318, and that if the court had properly instructed the commissioners which it appointed to assess the benefits and if they had, pursuant to such instructions, assessed such benefits against the railroad property, it would have no legal cause for complaint. It was, however, claimed that the report of the commissioners was impeached by the fact that they found identically the same amount of benefits in regard to each particular parcel of land that the original commissioners had found. It was further claimed that the application of the so-,called “unit rule” by the commissioners was erroneous and illegal. The principal question presented is whether or not the correctness of the instructions given by the trial court to the commissioners prior to their taking a view and hearing the evidence concerning the railroad property are to be reviewed here. The company made several requests for instructions which were refused, and it claims error in such refusal. The law makes no provision for instructions by the trial court to the commissioners appointed by it for the purpose of reassessing benefits or making awards in cases of this character. In this respect it is like- the general law in regard to condemnation proceedings. Usually, in matters of importance, by agreement of counsel, the district courts have adopted the highly commendable practice of advising the commissioners as to what elements of damage or benefit they should take into consideration in making their award or assessment. ■ This court approves of that practice, but may the correctness of such advice or instructions or may the refusal to instruct be reviewed here upon appeal? Neither party to this appeal has cited any authority upon this question, and we find none in the books. It must be borne in mind that these instructions to the commissioners were given or refused by the trial court prior to the commissioners’ view of the premises to be assessed and prior to their hearing of the evidence. In the case at bar the court gave only very general instructions and did not go into the specific elements for consideration. It refused the company’s requests which were more specific in relation to the enhancement of market value and as to railroad use. Later in the proceedings the court directed the commissioners to disregard benefits which might accrue from the construction of a United States post office on adjacent property. The details of these instructions need not be discussed in view of the conclusion at which we have arrived. There being no provision of law authorizing or requiring the court to instruct such commissioners, we regard the situation as within the court’s discretion. It may advise the commissioners, or it may not, as the circumstances appear to require. Usually it is advisable to do so, but in the present state of the law a refusal to instruct is not reviewable here. Neither are the instructions which are given subject to review. The premises are viewed and evidence taken after advice from the court. The commissioners, as they did here, may always apply for light in reference to situations or questions which may arise, but after all this occurs the report under the Elwell law is brought to .the court for confirmation and the court may set it aside for good cause and recommit the report or appoint a new board. If the court then finds that the commissioners have applied erroneous rules resulting in an unfair assessment, it takes appropriate action. It must be borne in mind that the assessment phase of these proceedings is an exercise of the taxing power and that the courts assist therein as a matter of convenience. In City of Duluth v. Dibblee, 62 Minn. 18, 63 N. W. 1117, 1119, which involved thvalidity of a special assessment, Mr. Justice Mitchell, speaking for this court, said [62 Minn. 27]: “It seems to us that counsel fail to appreciate the precise nature of these proceedings. They are but an exercise of the poiver of taxation. The confirmation of the assessment and the rendition of judgment for the amount by the court are not ‘judicial’• in the strict sense. They are but steps in an administrative proceeding) in which judicial assistance is invoked as a matter of convenience, because with its assistance the rights of parties and the interests of the public can best be protected and conserved. In Matter, of Trustees N. Y. P. E. P. School, 31 N. Y. 574. These proceedings might have been conducted from start to finish before or by administrative bodies or officers, *. * *. The nature of the proceedings is not changed by the mere fact that, at certain steps in their progress, the assistance of a court is invoked.” . That in the same proceeding property may be acquired by eminent domain does not alter the aspect of the assessment proceeding as an exercise of the taxing power. City of St. Louis v. Búss, 159 Mó. 9, 59 S. W. 969. The proceeding being essentially legislative and the courts merely functioning for the convenience of the legislature; in the manner by it prescribed, it follows' that in the absence of legislative provision for the instruction of ■ commissioners by the trial court we do not review such instructions or'the refusal to give them. ' Neither do we find that the application of the so-called “unit rule” results in injustice to' the company. It was entirely 'compatible with the exercise of independent judgment by the commis sioners as to each parcel. The fact alone that the commissioners arrived at the' same assessments as the commissioners first appointed is not fatal. These commissioners viewed the premises, heard evidence, and quité evidently gave the matter the benefit of their own judgment. In re Acquisition of Lands in City of Minneapolis, 161 Minn. 515, 200 N. W. 807. The judgment and order are affirmed. On Application for Reargument. On March 29, 1934, the following opinion was filed: LOB1NG, Justice. On this motion appellant states that we were under a misappre hension as to its having abandoned its contention that its railroad property was not assessable for benefits on account of the improvements of block 20. We therefore proceed to the consideration of that point. It is appellant’s claim that the railroad use to which the railroad property is subjected is the most valuable use to which it can be put, and that because its value is not enhanced for railroad purposes by the improvement of block 20 it cannot be said to be benefited notwithstanding the improvement may enhance its value for other and less valuable uses. In the case of In re Improvement of Superior Street, 172 Minn. 554, 216 N. W. 318, this court reviewed the authorities upon the assessability of railroad property for local improvements which did not enhance its value for railroad purposes. We there determined that such property was assessable, although apparently permanently devoted to railroad use. The only additional element which the appellant seeks to have considered in this case and which it thinks differentiates it from the Superior street case is that the railroad use to which the property is now being put is its most valuable use. Notwithstanding that fact, we are of the opinion that its market value might reasonably be found to be enhanced by such improvement. Under our holdings in the Superior street case and previous cases, it is enhancement of market value which justifies assessment of benefits for local improvements. We think that the enhancement of the value of land for other purposes may increase its market value notwithstanding its present and probable future devotion to railroad purposes. The railroad purpose may be its most valuable use and the land may not be rendered more valuable for that purpose, but market value is what is to be determined. That land is worth most for one purpose does not prevent a rise in its market value due to its enhancement in value for other and less valuable uses. The buyer and the seller may reasonably be influenced by the fact that should the vicissitudes of changing circumstances eliminate the most valuable use the land would, on account of the improvements, be more valuable for other purposes. As very well said by Mr. Justice Holmes in the case of Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Barber A. P. Co. 197 U. S. 430, 435, 25 S. Ct. 466, 468, 49 L. ed. 819: “On the question of benefits the present use is simply a prognostic, and the plea a prophecy. If an occupant could not escape by professing his desire for solitude and silence, the legislature may make a similar desire fortified by structures equally ineffective. It may say that it is enough that the land could be turned to purposes for which the paving would increase its value.” We think that the evidence was sufficient to justify the assessment of the appellant’s property. Too narrow a construction should not be placed upon the term “special benefits” in connection with a public improvement which in fact is found to enhance the market value of the property upon which benefits are assessed. A discussion upon this subject is found in Wabash Ry. Co. v. City of St. Louis (C. C. A.) 64 F. (2d) 921, 928. That court makes clear the distinction between the term “special benefits” as applied to tax proceedings of this character and when applied to an offset against damages when property is taken under the power of eminent domain. It also sets out on page 932 reasons why the general increase of value for other purposes may reasonably amount to a special benefit for railroad use. This also answers appellant’s contention in regard to property held as an easement and not in fee. The appellant has renewed its contention that the proceeding before the district court upon appeal, when that court by the authority of the Elwell law appoints new commissioners to reappraise the damages and reassess the benefits, is judicial in its nature and that the instructions then given or refused by the district court are subject to review here. That phase of the proceeding where the court appoints the commissioners for reappraisal and reassessment is not strictly judicial in character and for that purpose the court is acting for the convenience of the legislature; but when the report of the commissioners is made to the court the latter then acts judicially in determining whether the commissioners proceeded upon an erroneous view of the law or had misapplied some legal principle. Hughes v. Farnsworth, 137 Minn. 295, 163 N. W. 525. That is the time when appropriate action should he taken to determine whether the commissioners, due to incorrect advice, have made erroneous awards or assessments. As we said in our original opinion, it is wise in most cases that the commissioners he advised. Suitable requests are in order, but instructions claimed to be erroneous must be brought to the attention of the court when the report is before it for confirmation so that if necessary the report can again be referred under correct views of the law if the awards or assessments be found to be grounded upon an erroneous view or misapplication of the law or demonstrable mistake of fact. The report is then before the court for review in its judicial capacity. What property is benefited and how much are questions to be answered upon the facts as they appear and necessarily rest in the opinion of the commissioners who are named because of their experience in these matters and who hear evidence and examine the property. Their determination as to the property benefited and the extent of the benefits is, under the Edwell law, final and not reversible by a court unless it appears that it was fraudulent, arbitrary, or made upon a demonstrable mistake of fact. In re Improvement of Lake of the Isles Park, 152 Minn. 29, 36, 188 N. W. 54. The assessment is prima facie valid, and the burden rests upon the objector to establish its invalidity. In re Improvement of Superior Street, 172 Minn. 554, 216 N. W. 318; In re Widening of Fourth Street, 173 Minn. 67, 216 N. W. 607. The appellant has not met this burden. In our original opinion we stated that the instructions which are given or refused at the time the commissioners are appointed by the court are not subject to review. That statement should be ■understood in the light of what we have said here as to the appropriate action at the time the report is before the court for confirmation. Obviously the court may take into consideration at that time the character of the instructions which were given to the commissioners. It may do this in determining whether the report makes assessments that are based upon a demonstrable mistake of fact or in accordance with an erroneous rule or principle, hut such instructions must be brought before it by appropriate motion. We adhere to our original decision.

OLSEN, Justice. Defendant appeals from an order denying its alternative motion for judgment or a new trial after verdict for plaintiff. The action is for recovery of damages to plaintiff’s crops in June, 1931, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the defendant in the maintenance and operation of a small dam at the place where Pine Lake outlets into Pine River, whereby crops of plaintiff were flooded and destroyed. Plaintiff’s land, on which the damage is claimed, is located about 10 miles below the dam as the river flows. The part of the land on which the damage is claimed to have been caused is flat bottom land located some 50 to 60 rods away from the river. The complaint alleges that the defendant was negligent; in the maintenance of the dam and in the operation thereof and thereby caused the damage. The court submitted these two issues of negligence to the jury. The principal question for review is whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the jury in finding the defendant negligent on these grounds. The defendant has maintained and operated this dam for a number of years. A dam has been in existence at this place for more than 25 years. Defendant uses the dam to regulate the flow of water in Pine River, which is part of the water used by it in its hydroelectric plant at Sandstone. The dam consists of a wooden structure about 18 feet wide and earth embankments extending for about 100 feet on each side thereof. The earth embankments are three or four feet higher than the top of the wooden structure. There is a public road running across on top of the earth embankments, with a bridge across the outlet on the downstream side of the wooden structure. The wooden structure consists of a spillway about 10 feet wide and a gate about 8 feet wide. The gate proper consists of about 12 removable heavy planks or stoplogs, the insertion or removal of which regulates the flow of water through the gate. The wooden dam structure is about four feet high, constructed to hold back a head of water to that height. What happened was that on June 20, 21, and 22, 1931, an extraordinarily heavy rain fell on the territory over and surrounding Pine Lake and the Pine River valley, extending down beyond plaintiff’s land. The water in Pine Lake rose to such a height that it flowed over the spillway and gate in the dam and ran over and commenced to wash out the earth embankment on both sides adjoining the wooden structure of the dam. One witness testified that there was a break nearly six feet wide on the west side of the gate and probably four feet wide on the east side. The water was undermining the dirt on both sides of the structure. Other witnesses testified to these breaks and this washing out of the earth embankments. The washout was testified to as being about a foot or so deep and getting deeper. The water coming through these breaks did not flow over the road grade but flowed around the ends of the wooden structure and under the adjacent road bridge. The water was rising, and there was apparent danger of the earth embankments and roadway being overflowed and washed away. This was in the morning of the 22nd. One of the first men who came notified the defendant’s dam tender, Mr. Dosch, who lived near by. Mr. Dosch testified that when he arrived at the dam the water came around the wooden part of the dam on both sides and also over the dam; that it had washed out the dirt on both sides some four or five inches deep and was washing and getting deeper. He then, or a little later in the day, opened the gate in the dam. He hurried out and got some men to help stop the water flowing through the breaks in the earth embankments and to stop further erosion thereof. The town road supervisor was notified, and teams, wagons, and a scraper were brought. Bags of sand and earth were brought and deposited in the breaks and the earth filled in so that further flow of the water through and further erosion of the earth embankments were stopped sometime in the afternoon. Dosch testified that he got help to repair the breaks in the earth embankments “because if it washed the road there wouldn’t be no water for the dam to hold. It would all go out and take the road away.” The water continued to rise after the gate of the dam was opened and water was flowing through. The water remained higher than the wooden structure of the dam and flowed over it, as well as through the gate, for about two days. It did not rise as high as the roadway or overflow the road, and did not flow around the ends of the wooden structure after the breaks mentioned had been repaired and the earth embankments so strengthened. The gate in the dam was kept open for about six days and until the water in the lake had receded to the same height it was on the morning of June 21. This was about three inches below the top of the gate. The question of whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury in finding the defendant negligent is a close one. The plaintiff’s theory is that the dam as maintained by the defendant was negligently maintained in a condition insufficient to withstand the high stage of water in the lake, that this made it necessary to open the floodgate in the dam in order to prevent the dam from breaking, and that the water from the open floodgate, so released, came upon plaintiff’s land and caused damage; also that the floodgate was negligently kept open. Our decisions as to liability for damages caused by water escaping or released from dams used for industrial purposes, placed in rivers or natural watercourses, base liability of the owner or operator of the dam on the ground of negligence. Certain rules have been established, two of which are important here. The first rule is that stated in City W. P. Co. v. City of Fergus Falls, 113 Minn. 33, 128 N. W. 817, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 59, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 108, that the owner or operator of such a dam is not an insurer of its safety, but is bound to exercise a degree of care in its construction, maintenance, and operation proportionate to the injuries likely to result to others if it proves insufficient; in other words, care commensurate with' the danger. The dam must be sufficient to resist not merely ordinary freshets, but such extraordinary floods as may reasonably be anticipated. Gould v. Winona Gas Co. 100 Minn. 258, 111 N. W. 254, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 889; Bridgeman-Russell Co. v. City of Duluth, 158 Minn. 509, 197 N. W. 971. The second rule is that, while negligence must be shown, yet, if it is shown that water released from or escaping by reason of the breaking of such a dam, which but for the dam being there would not have come upon plaintiff’s land, then the maxim or rule of res ipsa loquitur applies where the instrumentality causing the damage is wholly within the control of the defendant and the result is such as could reasonably be anticipated. Gould v. Winona Gas Co. 100 Minn. 258, 111 N. W. 254, 10 L.R.A.(N.S.) 889; City W. P. Co. v. City of Fergus Falls, 113 Minn. 33, 128 N. W. 817, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 59, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 108; Barnard v. City of Fergus Falls, 115 Minn. 506, 132 N. W. 998; Winans v. Northern S. P. Co. 158 Minn. 62, 196 N. W. 811. That plaintiff’s land was flooded by overflow from Pine River and that the flood in the river came in part from the water released from the dam is not seriously controverted. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been applied in cases where a dam broke or partly broke down. See cases next above cited. Here, there was a partial break, which necessitated the opening of the floodgate. The doctrine does not apply where all the facts and circumstances as to the cause of the accident or injury fully appear in evidence. Heffter v. Northern S. P. Co. 173 Minn. 215, 217 N. W. 102. In the cases before cited there was evidence that the dams gave away from the pressure of the water. In the present case the dam partly failed and eroded by action of the water. It is difficult to make any distinction. There was no more explanation of the cause in the one case than in the other cases. But, irrespective of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the jury could draw all reasonable inferences from the facts shown. From the showing of the breaks around the ends of the wooden structure, the keeping of the gate open for some five or six days after the breaks were repaired and until the water was well below the top of the gate when closed, the jury could reasonably find that defendant was negligent in the maintenance and operation of the dam. It is urged that this was such an extraordinary rainfall that it could not have been reasonably anticipated. The rain extended over parts of three days. Apparently it did not rain continuously during that period. Conceding that over five inches of rain fell during that time, it yet remained a question of fact whether it was so great that it could not reasonably have been anticipated and guarded against in the exercise of due care. That much water fell on the Pine River valley and came into that valley from the surrounding territory between the dam and plaintiff’s land, as well as that falling on and coming over plaintiff’s land, is also apparent. But that a material part of the flood came from the water flowing over the wooden dam structure and through the gate of the dam is equally apparent. If a substantial part of the damage to plaintiff’s crops was caused by the negligent maintenance and operation of the dam, defendant would be liable for such damage although other water from the rainfall came into the Pine River and joined in the flood. In cases where, by negligence of the owner and operator, water from a dam is released by the opening or breaking thereof and causes injury, there is generally 'present in the stream other water from natural cause, which mingles with the water coming from the dam. The presence of such other water in the stream does not relieve the owner of the dam from liability. The case of Wadman v. Trout Lake Lbr. Co. 130 Minn. 80, 153 N. W. 269, involves facts somewhat similar to the present case in reference to heavy rains causing water to rise in a lake above a dam. It is contended that the flood would have occurred and the damage have resulted just the same if there had been no dam there and would have occurred also if all the water in the lake had been held back by the dam. At most these were questions of fact for the jury. Some reliance is placed on the fact that there were remains of two old logging dams, not in the river channel but on the low land adjoining the channel, and some other obstructions, tending to retard the flow of the flood water. The condition of the river valley was at all times well known to defendant, and there is no claim that the plaintiff caused any of these obstructions or was in any way responsible therefor. As far as appears, these conditions of the river valley existed at the time defendant acquired and constructed the present dam. A number of errors are assigned upon the charge of the court. The charge fairly and clearly submitted the issues to the jury, and we find no errors therein. Order affirmed. TORINO, Justice, took no part.

LORING, Justice. This is an appeal from an order sustaining^ a demurrer to plaintiff’s complaint in an action to enjoin the defendants from interfering with a contract which plaintiff had with a Dr. Grave. The complaint alleges that plaintiff, who is a layman, conducts what is termed a “health audit” in the city of Minneapolis. For a fee of ten dollars per year he contracts with his “subscribers” to furnish four urinalyses and a blood pressure test each year. The urine samples are sent in by mail as a general rule, and plaintiff then turns them over to Dr. Grave, a pathologist with whom he has a contract to furnish the results of the analyses to him. According to the plaintiff, if an analysis shows serious abnormal condition he advises his subscriber to consult a competent physician; but if the abnormality is slight he advises him in regard to proper diet, habits, and exercise should the report of Dr. Grave advise such. Plaintiff’s complaint specifically denies that he is practicing medicine or that the conduct of a health audit business consists of the practice of medicine. The defendants, who comprise the state board of medical examiners, advised Dr. Grave that plaintiff was engaged in the practice of medicine contrary to the laws of the state of Minnesota and at once to desist from making urinalyses for the plaintiff on the ground that it was illegal for Dr. Grave to furnish plaintiff with the results thereof for the benefit of the plaintiff’s subscribers. He accordingly desisted, and this action followed. It is the contention of respondents that Granger was engaged in the practice of medicine contrary to the provisions of 1 Mason Minn. St. 1927, § 5717, and that he was engaged.in the practice of healing as defined by the basic science law, 1 Mason Minn. St. 1927, § 5705-1. It is alleged in the complaint: “It is true that in some cases where an abnormal condition is not indicated but certain minor disturbances appear, plaintiff, after consultation with the pathologist, and repeating the advice given him by the pathologist, advises the subscriber as to certain improved habits of either diet, exercise, or living. Under no circumstances does plaintiff ever advise the taking of any medicine or any treatment, but suggests to all subscribers whose reports are repeatedly abnormal that they should consult their own physician. * That a urine analysis and blood pressure test furnish a convenient, reliable, and accurate indication of the state of a person’s health.” In our opinion, advising the subscriber for a fee as to certain improved habits of diet, exercise, or living, although not accompanied by any medical prescription or treatment, is a violation of § 5717. State v. Edmunds, 127 Iowa, 333, 101 N. W. 431; Heintze v. State Board, 107 N. J. L. 420, 153 A. 253. Diet, exercise, and mode of living are agencies for the relief of disease; indeed, they are the only known relief or treatment of some diseases. It further appears that the urinalyses and blood pressure tests are important as indicating the condition of a patient’s health, and when an abnormal condition is indicated the opinion of the pathologist is passed on by the plaintiff to his subscriber. In his complaint the plaintiff sets out some 22 items whose presence, absence, or quantity must be considered in determining the result of the analysis. The analysis and the test form a basis for a diagnosis. Necessarily the question of whether the analysis results in indications showing normal or abnormal conditions is a matter of professional medical opinion. Deductions must be drawn from the result of the analyses, and these deductions are of value only when made by a medical man. It cannot be otherwise. The pathologist is, of course, a licensed physician and in this case is said to be an expert in his line. Obviously, if he were in direct contact with the subscriber as a patient he would be practicing medicine in doing exactly what the plaintiff hired him to do. The results of his work the plaintiff passes on to his subscribers. It is settled law in this state that: “The science of diagnosing human diseases and human ailments has come to be a distinct branch or department of the medical profession; the diagnostician limiting his efforts to a discovery of the disease or ailment from which a patient may be suffering, its character and location, leaving the treatment thereof to some other physician or surgeon. This is a matter of common knowledge. And it requires no discussion or argument to demonstrate that the physician who thus applies his learning and energies is performing a highly important duty of the profession, and is engaged in the practice thereof, though he prescribes no drug and administers no specific treatment.” State v. Rolph, 140 Minn. 190, 194, 167 N. W. 553, 554, L. R. A. 1918D, 1096. If Dr. Grave was practicing medicine in what he did and in determining for the plaintiff whether the condition of the urine was normal or abnormal, then, in our opinion, the plaintiff was practicing medicine when he passed on to his subscribers the result of the analyses and the advice of the pathologist. It was as much practicing medicine for the plaintiff to engage Dr. Grave to do this for him as it would have been if he had attempted himself to perform these analyses, as he in fact did in the case of the blood pressure tests. To pass on to his subscribers advice as to whether or not the tests indicated a normal or abnormal condition and whether or not the subscriber should consult his physician or be content with the advice which plaintiff might give in regard to diet, exercise, or mode of living was practicing medicine. In In re Disbarment of Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N. W. 318, 73 A. L. R. 1319, we said that a corporation or layman could not indirectly practice law by hiring a licensed attorney to practice law for others for the benefit or profit of such hirer. We are just as firmly convinced that it is improper and contrary to statute and public policy for a corporation or layman to practice medicine in the same way. The obligation of Dr. Grave under his contract was to plaintiff, not to the subscribers. Plaintiff might engage anyone to perform these analyses. What the law intends is that the patient shall be the patient of the licensed physician, not of a corporation or layman. The obligations and duties of the physician demand no less. There is no place for a middleman. We see nothing in this to prevent life insurance companies from furnishing gratuitous examinations to their policyholders. They charge no fee and make the examination in furtherance of reduction of hazard. Neither do we see any objection to the employment by physicians of technicians and other experts, the results of whose Avork the physicians interpret as a help to diagnosis. 1 Mason Minn. St. 1927, § 5705-1, defines the practice of healing as including the diagnosis or analysis of the condition of human health. As above stated, the plaintiff has alleged in his complaint that the analyses and tests which he furnishes his subscribers constitute a convenient, reliable, and accurate indication of the state of a person’s health. It is so obAdous that what the plaintiff does in this regard is practicing healing within the provisions of the statute quoted that it is unnecessary further to discuss that subject. It follows that the contract between the plaintiff and Dr. Grave was in furtherance of plaintiff’s violation of these statutes. It was illegal, against public policy, and void, and no injunction will lie to prevent interference thereAvith. The order is affirmed.

DEVANEY, Chief Justice. In 1927 plaintiffs, husband and wife, were the owners of a certain tract of agricultural land situated in Blue Earth county, Minnesota. On March 17 of that year they executed to defendant Schwan a $15,000 note due in five years and secured the payment thereof by executing a mortgage on said tract of land. On February 1, 1932, close to the expiration of the five-year period, plaintiffs had not paid said note and further were indebted to defendant Schwan in the sum of $206.52 for 1931 taxes and $1,237.54 for defaulted interest. The parties entered into negotiations looking toward an adjustment of the indebtedness. As a result, plaintiffs executed a warranty deed under date of February 1, 1932, by which they conveyed their interest in the mortgaged premises to defendant Schwan, the mortgagee. As consideration for this conveyance, defendant Schwan canceled and surrendered the $15,000 note, released plaintiffs from all liability for defaulted interest and unpaid taxes, and duly executed and recorded a satisfaction of the mortgage. The next day, February 2, 1932, the parties entered into a contract for deed under the terms of which plaintiffs paid one dollar cash, remained on the land with no obligation to make any further payment until February 1, 1933, and had an option to repurchase the same upon the payment of $206.52 on February 1, 1933, and $16,237.54 on February 1, 1937. Plaintiffs failed to pay the sum due February 1, 1933, and as a consequence thereof defendants served upon plaintiffs the proper statutory notice to cancel the contract for deed. Plaintiffs now bring this action to enjoin defendants from canceling the contract, on the ground that the aforementioned warranty deed and contract, when taken together, are in equity a mortgage and should be declared by the court so to be. From an adverse decision of the trial court plaintiffs appeal. Thx*ee questions are involved: (1) Are the deed and the contract for deed effective according to their terms, or did the mortgage relationship continue despite these instruments so that only foreclosure could terminate it? (2) If the instruments were otherwise effective, was there present such duress or overreaching on the part of defendant as to render them merely further security for the mortgage indebtedness and not absolute? (3) Was it error to admit testimony of the present value of the land as bearing on the question of the adequacy of the consideration paid by defendant for the conveyance? It is firmly established that a mortgagor may not, at the time of, nor as a part of the mortgage transaction, bargain away his equity of redemption. Any attempt by the mortgagor so to do will not be enforced by a court of equity. So a deed, absolute on its face, if given to secure a debt, will be construed by a court of equity as a mortgage. King v. McCarthy, 50 Minn. 222, 52 N. W. 648; Stitt v. Rat Portage Lbr. Co. 96 Minn. 27, 104 N. W. 561; Teal v. Scandinavian-Am. Bank, 114 Minn. 435, 131 N. W. 486; Lundeen v. Nyborg, 161 Minn. 391, 201 N. W. 623. Similarly, an absolute deed with a contract for deed back, if shown to have been given to secure a debt, will be held to be a mortgage. Holien v. Slee, 120 Minn. 261, 139 N. W. 493. However, it is settled equally well that a mortgagor may bargain away, sell, or convey to the mortgagee his equity of redemption subsequent to the time that he executed the mortgage, De Lancey v. Finnegan, 86 Minn. 255, 90 N. W. 387; Webster v. McDowell, 102 Minn. 445, 113 N. W. 1021; McKinley v. State, 188 Minn. 325, 247 N. W. 389; 21 Harvard L. Rev. 459, 466; 29 Michigan L. Rev. 757, 758-759, provided that such a conveyance is not made pursuant to a collateral agreement contemporaneous with the execution of the mortgage. In re Edwards’ Estate, 11 Ir. Chan. Rep. 367; Plummer v. Ilse, 11 Wash. 5, 82 P. 1009, 2 L.R.A.(N.S.) 627, 111 A. S. R. 997; see Parmer v. Parmer, 71 Ala. 285, 288. The courts will, however, scan such a transaction carefully to see that the mortgagee took no undue advantage of the mortgagor’s necessities. From the early case of Niggeler v. Maurin, 31 Minn. 118, 121, 21 N. W. 369, 372, down to the present time, this court has expressed a steadfast determination to see that the transaction by which the mortgagor parts with his equity of redemption is untainted by oppression or overreaching. The court always has looked with jealousy at these transactions, “especially where the mortgagor is a needy man, and when there is pressure and inequality of position, and the sale has been at an undervalue.” Thus in De Lancey v. Finnegan, 86 Minn. 255, 261, 90 N. W. 387, 390, this court said: “The mortgagee may always purchase from the mortgagor his right of redemption, for a fair consideration, if the transaction is untainted by any oppression or advantage taken by the mortgagee of the necessities of the mortgagor. Equity will scan sales of the equity of redemption with jealous care, and require their fairness to be clearly established.” Accord, see Marshall v. Thompson, 39 Minn. 137, 110, 39 N. W. 309; Grannis v. Hitchcock, 118 Minn. 162, 165, 137 N. W. 186; Roehrs v. Thompson, 179 Minn. 73, 76, 228 N. W. 310. In 2 Jones, Mortgages (8 ed.) p. 201, § 878, it is said: “That a mortgagee may purchase the mortgagor’s equity of redemption was doubted in some early cases, but is as a general proposition true, though the transaction Avill be closely scrutinized, so as to prevent any oppression of the debtor. The maxim ‘once a mortgage always a mortgage,’ does not prohibit the mortgagor from releasing his equity of redemption to the mortgagee.” Where as in the instant case a mortgagor conveys the mortgaged land to the mortgagee and takes a contract for deed back, the transaction may be one of two things. Either it is a furnishing of further security for the payment of the mortgage debt, or it is an absolute deed, terminating the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee, extinguishing the mortgage debt, and vesting legal title to the land in the mortgagee. Whether one or the other of these results is reached depends, within limits, upon the intention of the parties. By virtue of 2 Mason Minn. St. 1927, § 9573, there no longer is a- presumption that conveyances between the mortgagor and the mortgagee are intended merely as additional security. See Jentzen v. Pruter, 148 Minn. 8, 12, 180 N. W. 1004; Roehrs v. Thompson, 179 Minn. 73, 75, 228 N. W. 340. This statute merely removes a presumption. It of course does not affect the burden of proof, which still is on the party attempting to prove that the deed, absolute on its face, is in fact a mortgage and intended as further security. Merchants Nat. Bank v. Stanton, 62 Minn. 204, 64 N. W. 390; Westberg v. Wilson, 185 Minn. 307, 241 N. W. 315; see Nelson v. Helmbrecht, 155 Minn. 327, 329, 193 N. W. 688. Moreover, it is still competent to show, despite this statute, that such an absolute conveyance was in fact intended as further security. The only effect of this statute is to replace upon the party attempting so to prove the duty of producing the first evidence on the issue since he has no longer the aid of a presumption. See 5 Wigmore, Ev. (2 ed.) § 2487, pp. 442, 445. In determining whether a conveyance from a mortgagor to a mortgagee constitutes further security for the mortgage debt or whether such is an absolute conveyance ending the mortgage relationship and vesting legal title to the land in the mortgagee, any one of the following factors, if found, will control: (a) If the mortgagee used oppressive means to exact the conveyance or took unconscionable advantage of the mortgagor’s necessities; (b) if the mortgagee paid the mortgagor an inadequate consideration for the conveyance, Holien v. Slee, 120 Minn. 261, 139 N. W. 493; Niggeler v. Maurin, 34 Minn. 118, 24 N. W. 369; Aretz v. Kloos, 89 Minn. 432, 95 N. W. 216, 769; or (c) if the parties made a parol agreement that the conveyance was not to be absolute, Grannis v. Hitchcock, 118 Minn. 462, 137 N. W. 186, the court will hold that the deed is not absolute but represents merely a furnishing of further security. Where the mortgagor gives an absolute deed to the mortgagee and none of the above factors are present, it would seem that the mortgagor intended completely to relinquish his title to the mortgagee, and the court will give effect to this intention. ' The fact here that the deed to Schwan and the contract from him back to the O’Connors were contemporaneous in point of time is of little consequence in this case. It has been contended that where, between a mortgagor and a mortgagee, a deed and contract for deed back are contemporaneous in point of time, this fact should be given careful consideration in connection with other facts in deciding whether it was intended that the mortgage relationship should continue. The force of this contention must however be considered in the light of the recent decision of McKinley v. State, 188 Minn. 325, 328, 217 N. W. 389, 390, where a deed by the mortgagor to the mortgagee and a contract for deed back were given on the same day, and the court squarely held that the mortgage relationship had been terminated and a new status assumed. The court there said: “The deed of June 7, 1928, from Mrs. Brown [mortgagor] to the state [mortgagee] put the title in the state; and the contract back of the same date gave her the equitable title. * * * There was nothing in the law preventing Mrs. Brown at the time of the transaction on June 7, 1928, transferring such title as she had to whomsoever would buy it; or she could transfer it to the state, which held the mortgage, in extinguishment of the mortgage debt; or, extinguishing the mortgage debt by her deed, she could take a contract for a deed, * * Since this latter case there can be no question but that the law attaches no particular significance to the contemporaneousness of the deed and contract back. See also De Lancey v. Finnegan, 86 Minn. 255, 90 N. W. 387. Under the rule that equity regards with great jealousy transactions whereby a mortgagor conveys his equity of redemption to a mortgagee, we come now to an examination of the facts of the instant case to ascertain whether there was present any one of the above mentioned three factors which, it was pointed out, will if present render a conveyance such as this merely additional security for the mortgage indebtedness and not a termination of the mortgage relationship. The trial court found “that there was no duress or undue influence exercised by defendant.” This finding finds ample support in the record. At the time of the execution of the deed and contract for deed, plaintiffs were indebted to defendant for the principal sum as well as $206.52 for hack taxes and $1,237.54 for interest. Defendant, in advising plaintiffs that he would foreclose forthwith if they did not give him a deed, was simply making a statement of his plain legal right. There was no threat of a deficiency judgment or of further embarrassment to plaintiffs except such as might result from foreclosure. That is defendant’s testimony, which apparently was accepted by the court. Nor do plaintiffs, O’Connors, indicate any such condition or facts as to show oppression. Plaintiffs had been advised as to their rights. Their banker drew the deed and contract and was present at the meeting where they were executed. It must be recalled also that by the terms of the contract for deed nothing was due and payable on the same for a year, at which time plaintiffs were obliged to pay only a sum equal to the hack taxes. Thus plaintiffs Avere granted and did enjoy one entire year of possession and income from the farm free from any payments except the sum of one dollar paid at the time of the execution of the contract. Trae, the present economic depression and the prevailing hardship affecting all agricultural interests in the state has reached the plaintiffs, increased their burden, and made compliance with the terms of the mortgage agreement more difficult and onerous than would be the case under ordinary conditions. However much may be properly said respecting the plaintiffs’ position and the difficulties attendant upon an economic maladjustment affecting all agricultural interests, still we can by no process of reasoning translate that situation into oppression and duress by this defendant. We find after reviewing the record with care that here there was only the expressed purpose of the defend ant to exercise Ms legal rights, and that nowhere is there evidence of duress, overreaching, or oppression. The trial court specifically finds, and his finding is supported by the evidence, that the value of the land at the time of the conveyance was less than the amount of the mortgage indebtedness. Plaintiffs contend that it was error for the trial court to receive evidence as to the value of the land at this time. That the value of the land was material in determining whether or not defendant, mortgagee, paid an adequate consideration for the conveyance from the mortgagor cannot be doubted. That it was proper for the court to receive evidence of the value of the land as of the time of the execution of the deed and contract, even though land values were at that time generally depressed, there can be no serious question under the decisions of this court. In De Lancey v. Finnegan, 86 Minn. 255, 261, 90 N. W. 387, 390, it became important to determine whether a mortgagee had paid the mortgagor an adequate consideration for a conveyance of the equity of redemption. The court said: “Was the contract to purchase for a fair consideration, and free from any oppression or advantage taken by the mortgagee of the necessities of the mortgagor? The question must be considered from the viewpoint of the facts as they existed at that time, and not as they were five years later, when prosperity had come to brighten and bless, and the land had materially increased in value.” There was in this case no attempt to prove an oral agreement that the deed and contract were to be merely a part of the mortgage security. From the foregoing, we conclude that the deed and contract for deed were effective according to their terms; that there was no duress, oppression, or undue influence practiced by the mortgagee on the mortgagor; that the court ivas not in error in receiving evidence of the present value of the land, and therefore decree that the order below denying plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial be affirmed. Order affirmed.

HILTON, Justice. Defendant appeals from an order denying his alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. Action in the usual form on a promissory note for $300, interest and reasonable attorney’s fees. The note was dated February 15, 1932, payable to the First & Farmers State Bank of Ghent, Minnesota, due six months after date with' interest at six per cent, and provided for reasonable attorney’s fees in case of suit. On March 19, 1932, the bank was taken over by plaintiff for liquidation. The note was among the bank’s assets. The answer, in addition to a general denial, alleged that if defendant ever gave the note it Avas given without consideration and was void, and that if he did give the note it had been paid in full long before the commencement of this action. In section two of the fourth paragraph of the answer defendant admitted that on February 15, 1932, he was indebted to the bank on his promissory note in the sum of $300, but alleged that on that day the bank was indebted to him on a certificate of deposit in the sum of $1,018.50; that on that same day he obtained that sum in full from the bank and paid the note out of the same. The case Avas tried to a jury. On cross-examination under the statute defendant admitted receiving $100 from the bank on February 15, 1932, and that he received back a note for $200 previously given it by him; that on that date he executed the note in suit; and that since that date he had not been in the bank and paid the note. On examination by his owm counsel he denied ever receiving anything for the note other than his own money. He testified that on October 1, 1931, he transferred $700 from a certificate of deposit ($1,018.50) to his checking account, received $18.50 in cash, and left the balance of $300 in the bank. Counsel offered to prove by testimony of the defendant that on February 15, 1932, the bank was indebted to him in the sum of $300, and that on that date or shortly thereafter he instructed the bank to apply that sum towards the payment of the note. That was objected to as immaterial, an attempt to vary the terms of a written instrument, inadmissible after the testimony already in the record, and inadmissible under the pleadings. The objection was sustained. Near the close of the trial counsel moved to amend section two of paragraph four of the answer by alleging that on October 1, 1931, he left $300 in the bank under an agreement that he could withdraw that sum at any time; that on February 9, 1932, he drew out $200, giving 1ns note therefor; that on February' 15, 1932, he drew out $100 more and gave the bank the note here in suit; that on that date or shortly thereafter he told the bank to apply the $300 on the note, and that it agreed to do so. An objection was made thereto on the ground that the amendment “would be a complete about-face from the defense pleaded,” and that plaintiff was not prepared to meet it, not having in court the officer with whom the conversation was claimed to have been had. The objection was sustained. Counsel then offered to prove by the testimony of defendant the allegations of the proposed amendment, including the return of the $200 note to him. The offer was objected to. Before ruling thereon the court asked defendant’s counsel if the claimed agreement relative to the application of the $300 on the note was in writing. He answered, “No.” A like answer was given to the question of the court as to whether it was the claim of defendant that he gave a check for $300. The court then asked: “Is there any claim that there were any records made on the books of the bank about the $300 being a deposit of any kind?” To which defendant’s counsel answered, “I don’t know, I had no access to the records, and I do not know.” The records of the bank covering defendant’s account were in court, having been brought there by plaintiff’s counsel in response to a notice to produce, which notice also called for the production of a paper referred to therein as “That waiver or contract dated April 15th, 1931, which was made and executed by the said Adolph Van Overbeke and delivered to the said bank.” All the records and papers asked for were then proffered to defendant’s counsel. The “waiver or contract” ivas called to the attention of the court, but was not offered or received in evidence and is not here. However, the affairs of the same bank were involved in First & Farmers State Bank of Ghent v. Soenen, 189 Minn. 541, 250 N. W. 359. In that case it ivas disclosed that on April 15, 1931, depositors of the bank holding 81 per cent of the deposits signed agreements reducing their claims 30 per cent. That case had been tried by the same counsel and before the same judge. At the direction of the court the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff for the full amount claimed, including attorney’s fees of $50 admitted by counsel to be reasonable. There are numerous assignments of error to rulings to which no exceptions were taken nor assigned in the notice of motion for judgment or a new trial. The blanket assignment in that notice, “Errors of law occurring at the trial, and either excepted to at the time or hereinafter assigned in this notice of motion,” is not sufficient to present here for review errors not excepted to at the trial. Such errors must be clearly specified in the notice of motion. 5 Dunnell, Minn. Dig. (2 ed. & Supp.) § 7091. We have considered all the claimed errors properly raised and find no ground for reversal. In the main they refer to the court’s refusal to allow the amendment to the answer and the offered proof to substantiate the allegations therein. If the amendment was properly refused, as we think it was, the offered proof was inadmissible. On the state of the record Ave cannot say that the court abused its discretion in refusing to allow the amendment to the ansAver. Affirmed.